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ARTICLE 
 
 
 
 
Collaborative Departmentalism 
MATTHEW STEILEN† 
  
It is thus borne in upon one that the principle of depart-
mental autonomy does not necessarily spell departmental con-
flict, but that mutual consultation and collaboration are quite 
as logical deductions from it. 
—Edward Corwin 
INTRODUCTION 
Presidential independence in matters of constitutional 
interpretation is almost always controversial. Any hint of it 
generates heat. In late March 2012, for instance, as the 
country strained to read the tea leaves in the oral argument 
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Howard Kaplan, Tony O’Rourke, Jack Schlegel, and (especially) Jim Wooten. 
Thanks also to members of the law school’s Junior Faculty Forum, to the 
University at Buffalo Department of Philosophy, and to participants at the 
Loyola University of Chicago’s Third Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium, 
where earlier versions of this Article were presented. Finally, thanks to Joe 
Gerken for excellent research assistance.  
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in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius1—the health care 
case—it was reported that Judge Kavanaugh of the D.C. 
Circuit had given the “thumbs up” to the suggestion that, 
even if the law was upheld by the Supreme Court, a 
Republican president could simply decline to enforce it 
because the president believed the law unconstitutional.2 A 
legal journalist reporting on Judge Kavanaugh’s comments 
described the view as “bizarre.”3 In response, a prominent 
academic wrote a letter to the editor, suggesting that the 
journalist was unfamiliar with basic constitutional history.4 
Some cheered the letter,5 but others did not, and one week 
later the academic sought to clarify his position.6 
The exchange, the passion, and the variety of views are 
all typical of this topic. A similar fusillade followed the 
announcement by President Obama that the Department of 
Justice would no longer defend the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), having concluded the law was unconstitutional.7 
And, of course, all of this pales in comparison to the 
collective hand-wringing over the constitutional views 
announced by the Bush administration.8 So why is it that 
independent presidential interpretation of the Constitution 
  
 1. No. 11-393, slip op.; oral argument, Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. __ , 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-393.pdf. 
 2. See Jeffrey Toobin, Holding Court, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 2012, at 41. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Michael Dorf, A Letter in Response to Jeffrey Toobin’s Article, NEW 
YORKER, Apr. 9, 2012, at 3. 
 5. Jonathan H. Adler, Professor Dorf Takes Jeffrey Toobin Back to School, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 3, 2012, 3:48 PM), 
www.volokh.com/2012/04/03/professor-dort-takes-jeffrey-toobin-back-to-school/. 
 6. Michael Dorf, Was I as Sloppy as Jeffrey Toobin?, DORF ON LAW (Apr. 11, 
2012, 12:30 AM), www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/04/was-i-as-sloppy-as-jeff-
toobin.html. 
 7. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, The Incoherence of President Obama’s Stance 
on Gay Marriage, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 10, 2012, 12:59 PM), 
www.volokh.com/2012/05/10/the-incoherence-of-president-obamas-stance-on-
gay-marriage/. 
 8. See Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do? Interpreting the 
Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 
395-96 (2008). 
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generates such controversy? Why isn’t it familiar and 
comfortable for lawyers, despite its considerable historical 
pedigree? One answer touches on presidential control. The 
Constitution is supposed to control the president. If the 
president can interpret it himself, how can it do this? Won’t 
he just interpret the Constitution in a way that slacks 
control, or even adds to his power? 
The idea developed in this Article is that judicial 
supremacy in matters of constitutional interpretation is 
unnecessary for presidential control—and that it may be, in 
fact, counterproductive. “Judicial supremacy” is the view 
that the Supreme Court is the last and highest expositor of 
constitutional meaning.9 As the Court put it in Cooper v. 
Aaron, “the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of 
the law of the Constitution.”10 The usual view is that judicial 
supremacy is necessary for legal control of the political 
branches. This is the view taken by the Court, which 
recently described judicial supremacy in terms that 
suggested it was necessary for constitutional governance.11 
And, of course, there is something to be said for this view. 
“Departmentalism”—the idea that each branch of the 
federal government enjoys independent authority to 
interpret the Constitution—is usually associated with 
recalcitrance and resistance to the rule of law. Indeed, all 
the major historical examples of departmentalism can be 
made to fit this pattern. Thomas Jefferson, Andrew 
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt are all 
famous for their battles with the courts, and for their 
assertions that they were ungoverned by certain judicial 
pronouncements.12 As one political scientist put it, writing 
  
 9. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
 10. Id.; see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (“‘[T]his Court [is 
the] ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.’” (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 211 (1962))).  
 11. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529, 535-36 (1997). 
 12. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 28-81 (2007). 
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in the early 1970s, departmentalism is in effect a doctrine of 
“executive supremacy.”13 
Even defenders of departmentalism take this view. For 
present purposes, we can think of defenders as dividing into 
three camps: presidentialists, popular constitutionalists, 
and critics of judicial supremacy. Each has its reasons for 
endorsing departmentalism. Presidentialists cast 
departmentalism as essential to the leadership task of 
transforming government to meet the problems of the day.14 
The strong president, they suggest, will find the theory 
necessary to his effort to remake the constitutional regime.15 
Popular constitutionalists argue that departmentalism 
preserves the role of the people as the Constitution’s 
ultimate expositor.16 The people’s views, they say, are better 
reflected in the constitutional constructions of the political 
branches, which departmentalism protects.17 Lastly, critics 
of judicial supremacy endorse departmentalism to the 
  
 13. ROBERT SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 16 (1971). 
Scigliano intended the argument as a criticism; but proponents of 
departmentalism and expansive presidential power make the same argument. 
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to 
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 277-78 (1994) [hereinafter Paulsen, The 
Most Dangerous Branch]. 
 14. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 69-71, 96-99, 168-
69 (2008); DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 115-96 (2003); 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 28-81; Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional 
Construction and Departmentalism: A Case Study of the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Demise of the Whig Presidency, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 425, 435-57 (2010); cf. 
EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS 
AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 69-84 (1938) (identifying presidential 
assertions of departmentalism).  
 15. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 52. 
 16. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 3-8 (2004); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING 
THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 6-32 (1999); see also Robert Post & 
Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial 
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1031-34 (2004) (discussing Kramer’s 
scholarship). 
 17. See KRAMER, supra note 16, at 106-14, 201; cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1341, 1350-53 
(2001) (defending congressional supremacy on the grounds that the legislature 
better reflects the people’s views). 
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extent that it entails abandoning the unilateral judicial 
determination of constitutional meaning, a practice that is 
undesirable for a variety of reasons.18 What unites these 
camps is obviously a specific vision of government. That 
vision emphasizes the importance of “constitutional 
politics”—i.e., the significance of non-judicial action for 
constitutional meaning—and limits the role of the federal 
courts.19 The two parts of the vision are related, since the 
struggle over constitutional meaning is assumed to be a 
zero-sum game.20 In other words, according to its defenders, 
departmentalism reduces the authority of the courts in 
  
 18. See, e.g., JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 96-152 (1984) (arguing that judicial supremacy is inconsistent with 
the proper role of the court in constitutional democracy); SUSAN R. BURGESS, 
CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION AND WAR POWERS 
DEBATE 109-26 (1992) (arguing that departmentalism fosters respect among the 
political branches for constitutional boundaries); ROBERT A. BURT, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 353-75 (1992) (arguing that judicial supremacy is 
inconsistent with mutual respect in constitutional discourse); LOUIS FISHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 231-74 
(1988) (arguing that departmentalism and justiciability doctrines facilitate 
interbranch dialogue about constitutional meaning); Neal Devins & Louis 
Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 84 
(1998) (arguing judicial exclusivity is undesirable); Barry Friedman, Dialogue 
and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 578 (1993) (suggesting that a need to 
legitimize judicial review has misled scholarship); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall 
Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 
401, 401-02 (1986) (arguing that constitutional interpretation sometimes 
requires non-judicial determination); cf. Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, 
Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 67, 82 (2000) 
(“Because constitutional meaning is so wrapped up in broader questions of 
governance, constitutional interpretation should be a shared endeavor among 
(at the least) all the branches of the national, state, and local governments.”). 
 19. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 6-14; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial 
Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 43, 43-45 (1993) (arguing departmentalism would lessen the authority of 
the federal courts). For an implicit acknowledgement that presidentialists and 
populists are allied on this issue, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361 
(1997). 
 20. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 52 (“The president and the 
judiciary compete over the same constitutional space, with the authority of 
presidents to reconstruct the inherited order supplanting judicial authority to 
settled disputed constitutional meaning.”). 
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order to strengthen the hand of some other player—the 
president, or the people, or the national legislature.  
Yet, critics and defenders aside, there are reasons to 
think the zero-sum logic is mistaken. My aim in this Article 
is to substantiate these reasons. To that end, I argue that a 
regime I call “moderate” departmentalism actually 
enhances the ability of the federal courts to restrict the 
exercise of presidential power. How could it possibly have 
such an effect? The core reason involves a familiar set of 
ideas about regulatory “governance,” applied in a new way.21 
Consider the following features of constitutional law. 
Constitutional law is fundamental law. Unlike ordinary 
law, which government enacts to restrain the people, 
fundamental law is “created by the people to regulate and 
restrain the government.”22 In this way, the president, as 
the head of a branch of government, is a stakeholder in the 
determination of constitutional meaning. His policies and 
the limits of his authority are at stake. Giving this 
stakeholder—the chief executive stakeholder—a role in the 
determination of constitutional meaning encourages his 
genuine involvement in deliberation about that meaning.23 
  
 21. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (1992); Jody Freeman, 
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 
(1997); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 342-49 
(2004); Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: 
An Introduction, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611, 1611-15 (2001). A related body of 
literature draws on parallels to engineering and industrial organization. See 
William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule 
Regimes, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 37-38 (Gráinne 
de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267-78 
(1998). Collaborative governance and stakeholder participation are also leading 
themes in research on environmental regulation and dispute resolution. See, 
e.g., MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 27, 201, 216-31 
(2004) (discussing the Quincy Library Group); Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking 
Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on Law and Governance, 23 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 441-45 (1999). 
 22. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 29. 
 23. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 18, at 100-01; discussion infra Part II.C. 
Open contestation of constitutional meaning among the branches also 
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And an executive with a hand in formulating constitutional 
rules is more likely to be bound by them in practice.24 In this 
respect, the president is no different from many business 
firms; firms that participate in making the administrative 
rules to which they are subject develop a kind of 
“ownership” over them—and ownership brings fidelity. 
Moderate departmentalism requires no major 
alternations to the basic constitutional scheme. Rather, it 
assumes that scheme, along with the “dialogical” process of 
lawmaking, litigation, and executive action that the scheme 
engenders. The difference comes in the informal norms 
guiding this process. Consider, again, the legal challenge to 
the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. The Court 
holds a hearing on the challenge and considers the views of 
executive attorneys on the matter. Suppose, this time, that 
the Supreme Court does strike down the law as exceeding 
Congress’s constitutional authority. In coming to this 
conclusion, the Court announces its considered view of the 
meaning of the Commerce Clause and the Taxing and 
Spending Clause, and shows why the clauses do not support 
the law. Under moderate departmentalism, the president 
need not accept those interpretations. He may, in the 
exercise of his constitutional powers, be guided by his own 
considered views. What concrete effects this has will depend 
on context; the president might decide to enforce the 
Affordable Care Act despite the Court’s decision 
invalidating it, but he might not, for reasons I discuss 
below. He might decline to enforce the Act, but continue to 
enforce laws resting on similar constructions of the 
Commerce Clause or the Taxing and Spending Clause. 
Whatever the president decides to do, the possibility of his 
acting independently encourages the Court to seriously 
consider his views and to fashion a rule that reflects them. 
Instead of the Court binding the president to fundamental 
law, departmentalism conceives of the president as binding 
  
incentivizes the people to actively involve themselves in determining 
constitutional meaning. See BURGESS, supra note 18, at 13-14, 121-26. 
 24. See Merrill, supra note 19, at 73 (“If the political branches strongly 
disagree with the [legally binding] judicial understanding, it will be ignored or 
distinguished or limited to its facts.”). 
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himself to law that he has influenced, and whose continued 
observance is supported, from his perspective, by a variety 
of moral, legal, and strategic reasons. 
Indeed, the last point is significant, since the president’s 
compliance with constitutional rules is not meant to follow 
from the logic of participation alone. Under moderate 
departmentalism, there are also important strategic reasons 
for the president to voluntarily comply with constitutional 
rules. The logic of what political scientists call “repeat play” 
supplements the logic of participation.25 Where the 
president’s participation in shaping a constitutional rule 
does not convince him, on balance, that he should comply 
with it, he may nonetheless comply to take advantage of 
certain future benefits.26 I argue that two future benefits are 
particularly important in this regard: first, avoiding future 
litigation losses that would likely follow from ignoring a 
constitutional rule announced by the Supreme Court; and 
second, obtaining future gains available only to a president 
with a reputation for compliance with constitutional law—a 
matter of significance in a political system like our own.27 
Such reasons make compliance rational for the president 
even where it comes at his present cost, say, by preventing 
him from using the full resources of the executive branch to 
achieve a favored policy.28 Additionally, a president who 
wants to avoid these costs will have reason to more fully 
participate in interbranch processes for determining 
constitutional meaning.29  
This, in a nutshell, is the case for moderate 
departmentalism I develop below. The argument cuts across 
the extant departmentalism literature in an unusual way. 
One can identify in the literature distinct approaches to the 
study of presidential interpretation. One approach is 
  
 25. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 51; discussion infra Part 
II.D.1. 
 26. See discussion infra Part II.D. 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Cf. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 47 (discussing mutual 
cooperativeness, which results in long term beneficial payoffs). 
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institutional in focus. These studies describe historical 
patterns of competition over interpretative authority 
between the institutions of government.30 Scholarship in 
this line tends to be both empirical and normative; it is 
empirical insofar as its methods and subject are historical, 
and it is normative insofar as it betrays (as it usually does) 
some approval of departmentalism. A second approach is 
legal, or “analytic,” in focus.31 These studies examine which 
  
 30. See, e.g., AGRESTO, supra note 18, at 9-10 (arguing constitutional 
interpretation was never intended to be in the sole province of the courts); 
BURGESS, supra note 18, at x-xii, 107 (examining congressional challenges to 
presidential assertions of authority in the war powers debates); FISHER, supra 
note 18, at 200-70 (analyzing the methods used by the president to curb 
judiciary overreaches); WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 5, 15 (examining how 
the doctrine of separation of powers is affected by the institutional struggle for 
constitutional leadership); Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 425-59 (examining 
departmentalism during the demise of the Whig conception of the presidency); 
Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review? Schooner Peggy and the Early 
Marshall Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 221, 224, 232-35 (1998) [hereinafter Graber, 
Establishing Judicial Review?] (arguing the early Marshall Court sought to 
preserve judicial power by asserting its existence, while not attempting to 
challenge executive or legislative authority in any controversial way); Mark A. 
Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 36-37 (1993) [hereinafter Graber, The Nonmajoritarian 
Difficulty] (arguing scholars should think about judicial review as presenting 
the nonmajoritarian difficulty because the real controversy is not between the 
elected officials and the judiciary, but rather between the different members of 
the dominant coalition). 
 31. This body of scholarship is already considerable and still growing. See, 
e.g., William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1990); Dawn E. 
Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable 
Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2000) [hereinafter Johnsen, Presidential 
Non-Enforcement]; Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Sanford Levinson, 
Constitutional Protestantism in Theory and Practice: Two Questions for Michael 
Stokes Paulsen and One for His Critics, 83 GEO. L.J. 373 (1994); Christopher N. 
May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal 
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865 (1994); Merrill, supra note 19; Arthur 
S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 
389 (1987); Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13; Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous 
Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 81 (1993); Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 
96 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2008); Neomi Rao, The President’s Sphere of Action, 45 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 527 (2009); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of 
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allocations of interpretative authority are lawful. Naturally, 
legal studies adduce traditional sources of constitutional 
argument—text, structure, and history—to defend a 
particular separation of judicial and executive power. Like 
the institutional studies, they tend to combine the 
descriptive and the normative.  
This Article falls in neither category. It is largely an 
institutional analysis, not a legal one; but it is also a 
theoretical analysis, not an empirical one. My hope is the 
approach speaks to both bodies of literature, and thus 
shows how institutional analysis can inform structural and 
doctrinal conclusions about the proper division of 
interpretative authority. Just to pick one example: a Court 
without the authority to decide constitutional questions for 
the other branches—as departmentalism envisions—need 
not rely on justiciability doctrines to limit the reach of its 
decisions. Its opinion on, say, the president’s war powers, is 
just that—its opinion. Whether the opinion is followed 
depends not on the Court’s ipse dixit, but on “organic” 
factors: on whether the president meaningfully participated 
in its formulation, thus giving him a reason to adopt the 
Court’s view as his own. 
I. THE IDEA OF “MODERATE” DEPARTMENTALISM 
The terms of the debate over departmentalism are by 
now relatively familiar. For a variety of reasons, it has 
become largely a debate about the relative interpretative 
roles of the Supreme Court and the president, not 
Congress.32 The central question posed in this debate is the 
extent of presidential interpretative power.33 A president 
may exercise the power of interpretation in a number of 
  
the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113 (1993) [hereinafter Strauss, 
Presidential Interpretation]; Daniel J. Crooks, III, In Defense of the Obama 
Administration’s Non-Defense of DOMA, 4 LEGIS. & POL’Y BRIEF (Aug. 5, 2012), 
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&conte
xt=lpb. 
 32. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 16-17. This is not to say that there 
are no important questions regarding Congress’s interpretative powers. See 
TUSHNET, supra note 16, at 17; Katyal, supra note 17, at 336. 
 33. See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 31, at 1271. 
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different ways; each raises a question about executive 
authority. For example, may the president decline to enforce 
a statute he believes is unconstitutional? What about a 
judgment? What about his obligation to defend laws 
challenged in court—may he decline to defend a law he 
believes is unconstitutional? 
In this Part, I answer some of these questions. I defend 
what I call (rather tendentiously) “moderate” 
departmentalism.34 In my usage, moderate departmentalism 
is the view that judicial precedent does not bind the 
president.35 Stare decisis is given “vertical” scope, within the 
federal courts (and state courts, where they interpret 
federal law), but zero “horizontal” scope among the branches 
of the federal government. Although precedent does not 
bind the president, a valid legal judgment may—at least 
when it requires the president to do something.36 The 
ultimate burden of the Article is to show that this form of 
departmentalism engenders interbranch collaboration about 
the content of constitutional law—in short, that “moderate” 
departmentalism is “collaborative” departmentalism. Before 
I get there, however, I need to describe moderate 
departmentalism in more detail. 
A. The Argument from Coordinacy 
Moderate departmentalism is a view about judicial 
precedent. Specifically, it is a view about which institutions 
of government are bound by judicial precedent. The core 
idea is that whether an institution is bound depends on its 
“rank” or “status” in the constitutional system. 
The framers regarded the departments created by the 
opening sections of Articles I, II, and III as being equal in 
  
 34. This appellation has also been used to describe a different theory—
Strauss’s view that the president has the same relationship to Supreme Court 
precedent as the Court itself does. Id. at 1298. The usage has not gained 
currency. 
 35. Thomas Merrill is probably the leading defender of this view. See Merrill, 
supra note 19, at 43-44. 
 36. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 31, at 1812. 
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status.37 In the language of the eighteenth century, the 
departments were “co-ordinate.”38 The issue came up as the 
framers tried to imagine how governmental violations of the 
Constitution might be corrected. For example, in the 
proposed constitution appended to his Notes on the State of 
Virginia, Jefferson suggested that such violations should be 
determined and corrected by a convention of the people.39 
The people, he thought, were the only ones with the 
authority to do such a thing.40 Madison took up the 
suggestion in The Federalist No. 49. He agreed with 
Jefferson that the design of the federal government seemed 
to necessitate popular appeal in such a circumstance; after 
all, no single department had been given the authority to 
correct the transgressions of the others.41 Instead, he wrote, 
the people had made the departments “perfectly co-ordinate 
by the terms of their common commission.”42 The point fit 
neatly in the framers’ emerging theory of separation of 
powers, which understood the departments not as 
representing different orders or estates of society, but as 
“essentially indistinguishable” representatives of the 
American people.43 
Coordinacy was an idea familiar to the framers from 
English oppositional thought in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Indeed, coordinacy had played a lead 
role in the exchange of pamphlets between 
parliamentarians and royalists at the opening of the 
  
 37. See SCIGLIANO, supra note 13, at 7; Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, 
supra note 13, at 231-32, 324-35. 
 38. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 273 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 
2005) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST NO. 49]. 
 39. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, 233-34 
(Forgotten Books 2012) (1829). 
 40. See id. at 172-79, 233-34. 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 38, at 273.  
 42. Id. 
 43. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, 
at 453 (1998 ed. 1998); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS 
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 276-77 (1996). The medieval 
English estates were the “lords temporal,” “lords spiritual,” and “commons,” 
which, in conjunction with the king, made up Parliament. 
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English Civil War.44 In response to the commons and lords’ 
assertion that they possessed several powers traditionally 
regarded as royal, Charles I had argued that the houses 
were equal in status to the king.45 Each, he said, was an 
“estate” in the English government. Yet Charles’s 
description of king, lords, and commons as estates was a 
marked contrast with the traditional view, which had 
recognized bishops, lords, and commons as the estates, 
making the king the head of the government.46 
Parliamentarians seized on Charles’s concession as proof 
that English government had always been “mixt,” its 
exercises of power the result of “coordination” between king, 
lords, and commons.47 Each of these estates, they argued, 
must consent to enact a law; and each estate necessarily 
enjoyed the power to resist the actions of the others.48 This 
would be possible only if the estates were equal in status or 
rank (“co-ordinate,” or “coordinative,” as Charles Herle 
termed it); otherwise one part would subordinate the 
others.49 The idea proved to have staying power. It persisted 
through England’s experiment with republicanism in the 
  
 44. J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 88-
89 (1955). This literature was familiar to the framers. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 34 (1992 ed.). 
 45. W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 25 (1965). 
 46. See, e.g., M.R.L.L. Kelly, Historical Analysis of Goldsworthy’s Sovereignty 
of Parliament, 27 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 156, 166 (2002); C. C. Weston, The Theory 
of Mixed Monarchy Under Charles I and After, 75 ENG. HIST. REV. 426, 428 
(1960). 
 47. Charles Herle, A Fuller Answer to a Treatise Written by Doctor Ferne 
(1642), in 1 THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY: SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH 
POLITICAL TRACTS 157-59 (Joyce Lee Malcom ed., 1999); see J.G.A. POCOCK, THE 
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC 
REPUBLICAN TRADITION 361-71 (1975); Weston, supra note 46, at 431-35. 
 48. See Herle, supra note 47. 
 49. See id. In a later pamphlet, Herle advanced the view that Commons was 
superior to the King in the lawmaking function, but coordinate in the executive 
function. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
43-44 (2d ed. 1998). 
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Commonwealth period and the Restoration at century’s 
end.50 
Coordinacy was thus firmly rooted in the vocabulary of 
eighteenth century political theory, and it is no surprise 
that it figured centrally in several American framers’ plans. 
As we have already seen, Madison thought it essential to 
understanding how constitutional boundaries would be 
enforced. Thus, in Federalist No. 49, he argued that because 
the departments were “co-ordinate by terms of their 
common commission,” no single department could “pretend 
to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries 
between their respective powers.”51 Enforcement had to 
utilize another mechanism. That mechanism, of course, is 
described in Federalist No. 51: departmental boundaries 
would be enforced not by a superior department, but by 
arranging the coordinate departments so that each checked 
the others by the exercise of its own powers.52 As Herle had 
suggested, the departments would only be able to resist one 
another if they were equal in status. Making one 
department “exclusive or superior” in questions of 
constitutional interpretation would be inconsistent with this 
design.53 
While the lesson of Federalist No. 51 is a familiar one, 
Madison left the connection to interpretative authority 
somewhat underdeveloped. Yet it is fairly straightforward 
to imagine how the argument might go. Consider the 
following, which expands on Madison’s claims.54 The 
departments are coordinate. This means they are equal in 
status. Since each branch is equal in status to the others, 
each is entitled to determine for itself how it should exercise 
  
 50. See VILE, supra note 49, at 44, 75, 120. 
 51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 38, at 273. 
 52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 281 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005); see 
KRAMER, supra note 16, at 47. 
 53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 38, at 273; see Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 233-35. 
 54. The following draws heavily on arguments made by Michael Stokes 
Paulsen and David Strauss. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra 
note 13, at 228-40; Strauss, Presidential Interpretation, supra note 31, at 121; 
see also Lawson & Moore, supra note 31, at 1287. 
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its expressly delegated powers. In other words, each is 
“independent” in the sense of being autonomous: no branch 
decides for another how the latter should act. What less 
could “coordinacy” mean? Now consider the power of 
constitutional interpretation. None of the branches is 
expressly delegated this power. Since constitutional 
interpretation gives content and scope to the expressly 
delegated powers, each branch must also be entitled to 
conduct the requisite constitutional interpretation according 
to its own best judgment. 
A variant of the same argument can be made using a 
comparison to the courts. A lower federal court is bound by 
the constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court. 
This is because lower federal courts are “inferior,” in the 
language of Article III, to the Supreme Court.55 But the 
president is not inferior to the Supreme Court; the 
president is equal in rank to the Supreme Court, as head of 
a coordinate branch of the federal government. Therefore, 
the president is not similarly obliged to follow the 
constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court—unless 
there is an independent argument to that end that is 
otherwise consistent with coordinacy.56 With respect to 
Supreme Court precedent, the president should be in the 
same position as the Court itself is: namely, as always 
possessing the authority to depart from precedent where 
doing so is appropriate.57  
It may help to run the argument in the other direction. 
Suppose that the president does not have the authority to 
independently interpret the Constitution. What, then, do we 
make of the pardon power? It is accepted that the president 
may invoke constitutional grounds to pardon an individual 
duly convicted of a crime in a federal court.58 Indeed, given 
that the pardon power limits the actions of the federal 
judiciary, it would constitute a radical rethinking of that 
  
 55. The argument treats this assertion as an assumption. It need not be. See 
Baude, supra note 31, at 1845 & n.213. 
 56. See Strauss, Presidential Interpretation, supra note 31, at 120. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 264-65. 
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power to insist that it could be exercised only in 
conformance with judicial constructions of the 
Constitution.59 Much the same can be said for the veto 
power; no one expects that the president should be confined 
to judicial precedent in deciding whether to veto a presented 
bill on constitutional grounds.60  
This is the argument from coordinacy. It begins with 
the idea that the departments are equal in status or rank. 
Its conclusion is that each department must enjoy authority 
to independently interpret the Constitution. No one 
department is the Constitution’s exclusive or superior 
interpreter. 
B. What Coordinacy Does and Does Not Imply 
All this is rather abstract. What does coordinacy mean 
for the specific questions, posed above, about executive 
authority?  
Consider first the familiar issue of “non-enforcement.” 
Non-enforcement is the president’s power to refuse to carry 
out the law because he believes it unconstitutional. A well-
known example is President Reagan’s refusal to enforce 
provisions of the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.61 
The Act permitted losing bidders on federal contracts to 
lodge a “protest” with the Comptroller General’s Office.62 
The Comptroller General was tasked with investigating the 
protest, during the pendency of which the contract could not 
be awarded to the winning bidder.63 Reagan’s 
  
 59. This is not to say that the pardon is merely an instrument of “clemency.” 
The pardon has a key law enforcement function as well, especially when used in 
exchange for favorable testimony or to incentivize compromise. See EDWARD S. 
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 180-81 (5th rev. ed. 
1984) [hereinafter CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT]; THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 397-98 
(Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005). Yet this function rests on the 
judiciary-limiting effect of the pardon. 
 60. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 264-65. 
 61. 98 Stat. 1199 (1984) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3556 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011)); see also Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prod. Div. v. 
Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 62. See § 3552. 
 63. See § 3553(c)(1), (d)(1). 
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administration instructed the agencies to disregard this 
stay provision; according to its view, the provision delegated 
to an officer of Congress (the Comptroller General) duties 
that belonged to executive officials, thus violating the 
separation of powers.64 Federal courts were highly critical of 
the administration’s conduct at the time.65 Yet since that 
time, judgment on the matter has shifted, at least among 
scholars of presidential power;66 today, most conclude that 
the Constitution supports some form of presidential non-
enforcement power.67 
Coordinacy is agnostic about non-enforcement. In other 
words, it is consistent with the conclusion that the president 
enjoys such a power, and with the conclusion that he does 
not. This is contrary to how coordinacy is sometimes 
presented.68 The reason coordinacy is consistent with both 
views is that the case for non-enforcement turns on the 
construction of the Take Care Clause and the Article II 
Oath Clause, and coordinacy is logically independent of the 
best construction of those clauses.69 Read either clause in a 
certain way, and it defeats the case for non-enforcement. 
Coordinacy cannot rule these readings out.  
Consider, for example, the Take Care Clause, which 
requires that the president “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”70 The plain language of the clause 
  
 64. See Lehman, 842 F.2d at 1102, 1105, 1119-20. 
 65. See, e.g., id. at 1126; cf. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 
F.2d 875, 889-90 & 889 n.11 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 66. This is true across the political spectrum. Compare Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 268-70, with Johnsen, Presidential Non-
Enforcement, supra note 31, at 14-15. 
 67. For a recent summary of the literature, see Prakash, supra note 31, at 
1618-28. 
 68. See, e.g., Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 240, 267 
(stating that it is a “logical consequence” of Madison’s statement of coordinacy 
that the President enjoys interpretative powers including non-enforcement). 
 69. See Strauss, Presidential Interpretation, supra note 31, at 117. The 
following argument focuses on the Take Care Clause. For the reading of the 
Oath Clause that poses a problem for non-enforcement, see Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 260. 
 70. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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imposes a duty on the president to see that the law is 
enforced. The question is whether that duty extends to laws 
the president regards as unconstitutional. There is some 
reason to think that it does; a number of (now well-known) 
historical and structural considerations support an 
affirmative answer.71 The principal evidence is the 
interlocking character of the Take Care Clause and the 
Presentment Clause. Presentment empowers Congress to 
override a president’s constitutional veto.72 The framers 
thus contemplated that the president would be faced with 
enforcing a law he believed unconstitutional, and plain 
language suggests that Take Care was intended to require 
the president to do just this—ruling out a power of non-
enforcement.73 
The point is not to endorse this particular reading of the 
Take Care Clause. The point is, rather, that (1) it is a 
reasonable reading, (2) it would rule out a power of non-
enforcement, and (3) coordinacy does not require its 
rejection. For those who disagree that it is a reasonable 
reading (perhaps because it does not permit exceptions to 
the duty to enforce), other constructions are also possible; a 
number of these constructions do allow exceptions but rule 
out a broad power of non-enforcement.74 Coordinacy does not 
exclude these possibilities—indeed, it simply does not 
require any particular construction of the Take Care 
Clause.75 Of course, coordinacy might weigh in favor of one 
  
 71. These considerations can be found in Johnsen, Presidential Non-
Enforcement, supra note 31, and May, supra note 31. 
 72. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 73. See May, supra note 31, at 876-81. A full defense of this position would 
require addressing the differences between the veto and non-enforcement, the 
issue posed by laws enacted prior to the president’s term, and the relevant 
founding-era evidence on presidential power. 
 74. See, e.g., Strauss, Presidential Interpretation, supra note 31, at 118 (“Or 
suppose the correct interpretation of the Take Care Clause is that the President 
must comply with any statute that is not clearly unconstitutional unless that 
statute infringes the President’s prerogatives.”). 
 75. See id. at 117-19. No one—with the possible exception of Paulsen—
maintains that non-enforcement follows from coordinacy alone. See Paulsen, The 
Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 241-44, 256-57. Instead, it is said to 
follow from presidential powers implied by the Take Care Clause, the Oath 
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interpretation and against another. But it is unclear which 
way this should cut. Would it be more appropriate to reject 
a construction of the Take Care Clause because it conflicted 
with coordinacy or conclude that the clause was meant to 
mark coordinacy’s outer limits? A well-supported 
construction of the Take Care Clause might teach us what 
coordinacy can and cannot mean.76 
Coordinacy is thus agnostic with respect to the non-
enforcement power. The same cannot be said for what is 
sometimes called “non-acquiescence.” Coordinacy does imply 
non-acquiescence, and thus, if one accepts the principle of 
coordinacy, one ought to support a presidential power of 
non-acquiescence. 
Non-acquiescence is the power to refuse to adopt a legal 
rule outside the context of the specific lawsuit in which it is 
announced.77 Like non-enforcement, it has a rather long 
history. Recent times again afford the example of President 
  
Clause, and the Article II Vesting Clause, in addition to the principle of 
coordinacy. See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 31, at 1280; Easterbrook, 
supra note 31, at 910, 920. This implies that if alternative readings of those 
clauses are available, one can (consistently) endorse coordinacy but not non-
enforcement. 
 76. Here is how Take Care might shed light on coordinacy. Some argue that 
coordinacy implies what we might call “strong departmental independence.” 
Strong departmental independence means that each department may freely 
interpret the Constitution, regardless of the actions taken by the others. In other 
words, no department can force another to take action inconsistent with the 
latter’s understanding of the Constitution. See, e.g., FARBER, supra note 14, at 
182; Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 221-22. This 
principle, however, is likely too strong, since it implies a freedom from 
interference or constraint, which (on its face, at least) is in tension with the 
doctrine of checks and balances. See FISHER, supra note 18, at 238-39. In 
contrast, departmental autonomy is the idea that each department is 
“independent” in the sense of being self-directed, but not immune from 
interference by the actions of others. See discussion supra Part I.A. This view 
contemplates that a department might be prevented, by the actions of another, 
from taking action to realize its view of the Constitution. A Take Care duty to 
enforce captures this idea perfectly: it requires the president to implement 
Congress’s views of the Constitution. 
 77. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by 
Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 687 (1989); Paulsen, The 
Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 272; Strauss, Presidential 
Interpretation, supra note 31, at 120-21. 
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Reagan, under whom certain agencies developed a practice 
of refusing to adopt in administrative proceedings the 
judicial precedents of the reviewing court of appeals.78 Yet 
intra-circuit non-acquiescence (as it was lovingly called) was 
not really departmentalism, since, as its defenders 
conceded, the Supreme Court remained the final arbiter of 
the meaning of federal law.79 Non-acquiescence to the 
Supreme Court is instead exemplified by the more distant 
example of President Lincoln and the Dred Scott decision.80 
In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln suggested that 
while the decision of the Supreme Court “must be binding in 
any case, upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that 
suit,” it did not bind others, including members of Congress 
and the administration.81 It was inconsistent with popular 
rule, he argued, for the “policy of the government, upon vital 
questions, affecting the whole people” to be set by the Court 
alone.82 As he had put it during the campaign:  
[W]e . . . oppose that decision [i.e., Dred Scott] as a political rule 
which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks 
it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or 
the president to favor no measure that does not actually concur 
with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound 
by it as a political rule in that way.
83
 
Lincoln thus distinguished a judicial decision from what 
might be called the constitutional “rule” on which it was 
based, and exempted presidents from a legal obligation to 
  
 78. See Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 77, at 694, 706. 
 79. See id. at 723, 725 (arguing that “the co-equal branch analogy” defended 
by Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese is inconsistent with the 
interpretative role of the Court as described in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 
(1958)). 
 80. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 81. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953); see 
also FARBER, supra note 14, at 179. 
 82. Lincoln, supra note 81, at 268. 
 83. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 275 (quoting 
Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Quincy, Ill. (Oct. 
13, 1858), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 81, at 
245, 255); see also AGRESTO, supra note 18, at 128. 
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adopt the latter.84 Indeed, President Lincoln went on to take 
action inconsistent with constitutional “rules” in Dred 
Scott.85 
It should be fairly clear that “non-acquiescence” in this 
sense is implied by the principle of coordinacy. If the 
political departments were obligated to adopt the rules 
announced by the Court, they would consequently not be 
free, as coordinacy requires, to exercise their powers 
according to their own understanding of the Constitution. 
What is somewhat harder to grasp is what non-acquiescence 
means in practice. The impact of the president’s refusal to 
adopt a constitutional interpretation announced by the 
Supreme Court will depend on the context. For example, 
because the president’s decision to pardon someone is 
regarded as judicially unreviewable, it is unlikely to lead to 
further legal action, even if it is based on a view of the 
Constitution at odds with the Court.86 Something similar 
goes for the veto.87 In these contexts, a regime of non-
acquiescence is functionally indistinguishable from a regime 
of judicial supremacy. 
The matter gets more complicated when we consider 
other forms of presidential non-acquiescence. Suppose the 
Court applies the canon of constitutional avoidance to 
construe a statute so that it complies with the Constitution, 
and in so doing narrows a grant of executive power 
conferred under that statute. In this case, the president’s 
decision not to adopt the Court’s construction could have a 
number of consequences whose effect is to force him to 
adopt the Court’s view. Most obviously, the president’s 
decision to non-acquiesce would give rise to further 
litigation that, governed by the Supreme Court’s rule, would 
lead to the same outcome—although the matter is 
somewhat more complicated, as I consider below. 
  
 84. As Herbert Wechsler summarized Lincoln’s view, “the Court decides a 
case; it does not pass a statute calling for obedience by all within the purview of 
the rule that is declared.” Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 
65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1965). 
 85. See Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 276. 
 86. See id. at 265. 
 87. See id. at 264-65. 
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Alternatively, Congress might decide to side with the Court, 
and use its lawmaking power to amend the language of the 
statute so as to reflect the Court’s views.88 Depending on 
one’s view of the Take Care Clause, this could create an 
obligation in the president to accede to Congress’s view. Yet 
these mechanisms, as well as the many other means of 
controlling the president available to the Congress and the 
Court89 hardly eliminate the effects of non-acquiescence. 
Where federal courts lack jurisdiction, judicial review of the 
president’s non-acquiescence will be unavailable. Congress 
may take action to limit or strip jurisdiction so as to protect 
the president’s constitutional views.90 Even where 
jurisdiction exists, not all those affected by the president’s 
policy will be able to bring suit.91 The reality is that the 
president, more than any other federal officer or legislator, 
conducts a large amount of activity without external 
supervision, and over a time scale and in conditions that 
effectively preclude interference by another branch.92 
In short, a presidential policy of non-acquiescence would 
matter.93 Going forward, I will use the expression “moderate 
departmentalism” to describe presidential interpretative 
powers, rather than non-enforcement or non-acquiescence. 
This expression is intended to describe an allocation of 
interpretative authority that, as I have argued, follows from 
  
 88. Cf. Rao, supra note 31, at 534-35 (discussing Congress’s use of the 
lawmaking power to advance its view of constitutional meaning). 
 89. The devices are numerous, and include, on the congressional side, (1) 
impeachment, (2) amendment, (3) eliminating executive funding, (4) impeding 
appointments, and (5) conducting investigations, as well as others. See generally 
id. On the judicial side, mechanisms of control include injunctions and 
contempt. 
 90. The classic exploration of this idea is in Wechsler, supra note 84, at 1004-
06. 
 91. Standing doctrine will narrow those who can bring suit. See Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984). 
 92. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: 
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 7-12 (2010). 
 93. Indeed, when Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese defended what 
was essentially moderate departmentalism, it caused a political firestorm. See 
Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Precedent, 61 TUL. L. 
REV. 991, 991-93 (1987). 
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the principle of coordinacy—namely, non-acquiescence 
without a general power of non-enforcement.94 In addition, 
as described above, I assume the president is obliged to 
enforce valid legal judgments. I take no position on the 
many other questions of presidential interpretative 
authority, such as the duty to defend a law in court.95 Below, 
I describe this suite of presidential powers and obligations 
as the elimination of the “horizontal” dimension of stare 
decisis.96 
II. WHY MODERATE DEPARTMENTALISM IS COLLABORATIVE 
My argument in this Part is that moderate 
departmentalism is collaborative. In other words, I want to 
show how moderate departmentalism results not in 
presidential interpretative supremacy, but in a collaborative 
effort to determine constitutional meaning and in greater 
presidential compliance with the law. 
This argument challenges certain prevailing views in 
the institutional literature on departmentalism. In 
particular, the literature describes departmentalism as a 
kind of zero-sum contest over the allocation of interpretative 
authority, and thus regards presidential assertions of 
interpretative authority as ipso facto judicial deprivations. 
The analysis is important and insightful, but it also limits 
our understanding of departmentalism. I want to show how 
this is the case by examining the work of Keith Whittington 
and Stephen Skowronek on presidential leadership and the 
Supreme Court. 
  
 94. This view of presidential interpretative authority has been defended 
before, but appears to have been eclipsed somewhat by the movement in recent 
scholarship towards non-enforcement power. See AGRESTO, supra note 18, at 
128-29; Neuborne, supra note 93; cf. BURGESS, supra note 18, at 109-26; FISHER, 
supra note 18, at 231-47, 275-79; Murphy, supra note 18, at 417. 
 95. I do assume that the president has the power to decline to enforce a law 
the Supreme Court has invalidated, or a law similar to one invalidated. He also 
has the authority to pardon and veto on the basis of his views about 
constitutional meaning. 
 96. Cf. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 237 (invoking 
similar terminology to analyze theories of judicial supremacy). 
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A. Two Views of Departmentalism 
1. From Skowronek to Whittington on Presidential 
Leadership. I begin with Skowronek’s model of leadership. 
Presidential leadership, argues Skowronek, is a matter of 
the president’s authority to exercise his powers in ways that 
give effect to his vision for society.97 This authority is not 
fixed, but depends on political context. Thus, although the 
office of the presidency is, by its nature, potentially 
disruptive of the existing “constitutional regime,” few 
presidents are able to realize this potential.98 Most find 
themselves in a political context in which so using their 
power would be impossible or irrational given the cost. 
Indeed, there is only one major exception. According to 
Skowronek, when the extant regime is weak, or failing, and 
the president enters office openly opposed to it, a 
“reconstructive” politics of leadership is possible, in which 
the president uses the powers of his office to essentially 
“remake” American government.99 Think, says Skowronek, 
of Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, who 
came into office as the constitutional regime was crumbing, 
who had campaigned essentially against that regime, and 
who succeeded in replacing it with one premised on a very 
different view of political society.100 For such presidents, he 
says, the “order-shattering” and “order-affirming” 
dimensions of the presidency converge: the president 
disposes of the failing regime and creates a new one by 
reinterpreting the “mythic” first principles of our system.101 
Keith Whittington extends Skowronek’s analysis to the 
constitutional dimension of leadership. According to 
Whittington, constitutional claims are an essential aspect of 
  
 97. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 24 (1993). 
 98. In this context, “constitutional regime” refers to the basic “arrangement” 
of the institutions of government and to the “commitments of ideology and 
interest[s]” those arrangements embody. See id. at 34; see also Jack M. Balkin, 
The Roots of the Living Constitution, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1129, 1135 (2012) (defining 
“constitutional regime”). 
 99. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 97, at 37. 
 100. Id. at 36-37. 
 101. See id. at 20, 37. 
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political leadership, and thus, a variety of political actors 
assert such claims. History evidences major shifts in whose 
constitutional claims are regarded as authoritative; as 
Whittington describes, presidents, legislative leaders, the 
Supreme Court, state governors, citizens, and associations 
have all claimed, and exercised, independent interpretative 
authority.102 Success for one of these actors comes at the 
expense of the others. Leaders strengthen their position by 
resting their agenda on constitutional foundations, and by 
undermining the interpretative claims of their competitors. 
The result, at least at times, is an open struggle for 
interpretative supremacy. As Whittington describes it, 
“various political actors have struggled for the authority to 
interpret the Constitution. They have sought to displace 
other potential constitutional interpreters, and to assert 
their own primary authority to determine the content of 
contested constitutional principles.”103 
Reconstructive presidents, in particular, regard 
interpretative authority as essential to their task.104 
Consider again the features of reconstructive politics, in 
which the president comes to power while the extant regime 
is faltering, perhaps because it has failed to meet the 
challenges of the day. The reconstructive president stakes 
his “warrant” for exercising power on a fundamental 
opposition to that regime.105 That opposition, argues 
Whittington, must be expressed in constitutional terms. 
Reconstructive efforts rest on the ability of the president to 
articulate a compelling “constitutional vision”: a “positive 
vision of how political power should be used” that is both 
rooted in the Constitution and supports the president’s 
specific public policy objectives.106 For example, Jefferson’s 
  
 102. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 15, 51; cf. Daryl J. Levinson, 
Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 657, 729 (2011) [hereinafter Levinson, Parchment and Politics] 
(describing the shift of powers between Congress and other institutions and 
actors). 
 103. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 15. 
 104. See id. at 49-71 (describing the reconstructive presidents). 
 105. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 97, at 34. 
 106. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 53-54. 
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election in 1800 “meant saving the Constitution from the 
Federalists’ centralizing and monarchical tendencies.”107 
Similarly, Roosevelt’s defense of the New Deal aimed to 
provide a constitutional basis for policies securing economic 
social justice.108  
These claims bring the president into conflict with the 
courts. The judiciary, Whittington says, poses “an intrinsic 
challenge” to the president’s effort to articulate a new 
constitutional vision, and ongoing judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution “necessarily frustrates” presidential 
reconstructive ambitions.109 This is true regardless of 
whether the courts actively attack presidential initiatives; 
their authority alone constitutes a “threat” to the 
reconstruction.110 The threat leads reconstructive presidents 
to attack the courts, framing any judicial efforts to defend 
the dominant regime as “political” interference rather than 
proper “legal” decision-making.111 Once the Court is viewed 
as “simply taking sides,” the president’s interpretative 
authority is enhanced.112 In Whittington’s words, the 
reconstructive president and the judiciary “compete over the 
same constitutional space, with the authority of presidents 
to reconstruct the inherited order supplanting judicial 
authority to settle disputed constitutional meaning.”113 
2. Transferring Authority and Sharing Authority. 
Nothing in Whittington’s argument implies that 
departmentalism is necessarily reconstructive. The 
argument runs in the other direction. Yet if certain aspects 
of the argument are emphasized, the connection between 
departmentalism and reconstruction becomes so strong that 
  
 107. Id. at 54. 
 108. See id. at 57-58. 
 109. Id. at 52. But cf. id. at 53 (“Reconstructive presidents need not be hostile 
to courts per se or judicial review in general. For most presidents, there may be 
occasional disagreements with the Court and efforts to alter the trajectory of 
constitutional law, but there is no crisis of, or challenge to, judicial authority.”). 
 110. Id. at 74. 
 111. See id. at 66. 
 112. Id. at 69-70. 
 113. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
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it is difficult to understand how departmentalism is possible 
outside the reconstructive enterprise. Departmentalism, we 
might say, emphasizing a strand in the argument above, is 
essentially a presidential justification for taking 
interpretative power away from another political actor. Yet 
taking interpretative power is something possible and 
desirable only within the politics of reconstruction (more 
precisely, it defines such a politics).114 Skowronek’s 
“affiliated” presidents have little interest in exercising such 
a power, given its costs. And Skowronek’s “preemptive” 
leaders—presidents opposed to a vibrant (not failing) 
regime—generally lack the political strength to mount the 
challenge.115 From this perspective, departmentalism is best 
understood as a tool, or means, of reconstruction. But if it is 
a means of reconstruction, then a fortiori it is limited to 
reconstruction. 
What’s being emphasized, in effect, is the “zero-sum” 
character of changes in interpretative authority.116 An 
examination of Whittington’s language suggests the 
emphasis is a fair one. He tells us, for example, that the 
president and the courts “compete over the same 
constitutional space,”117 that the reconstructive president 
must “supplant[] judicial authority to settle disputed 
  
 114. To be sure, Whittington doesn’t associate departmentalism exclusively 
with reconstructive presidents. He explores the use of the veto power by non-
reconstructive presidents to advance their interpretations of the Constitution. 
See id. at 170-95. Yet this “domesticated departmentalism,” as Whittington calls 
it, is quite modest. See id. at 170. In fact, it is not clear whether domesticated 
departmentalism is properly regarded as departmentalism at all; according to 
Whittington, non-reconstructive presidents who used the veto to advance their 
constitutional interpretations were “careful to recognize the superior warrants 
of the Court to act as the ultimate constitutional interpreter.” Id. at 171. This, 
however, is judicial supremacy. Moreover, elsewhere Whittington does suggest 
that (non-domesticated) departmentalism is “fundamentally connected to the 
politics of reconstruction.” See id. at 50, 77-80. 
 115. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 161. 
 116. Here I mean to draw on the idea of zero-sum games as developed in game 
theory. See DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION 13-14 (2002); ANATOL RAPOPORT, TWO-
PERSON GAME THEORY: THE ESSENTIAL IDEAS 94-95 (1966); Richard H. McAdams, 
Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 209, 218-19 (2009). 
 117. WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 52. 
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constitutional meaning,”118 that “[t]he president reclaims the 
authority of [interpreting] the Constitution by 
delegitimating the supremacy of the Court,”119 that 
“[s]hifting the right to render authoritative decisions 
regarding contested constitutional meaning from presidents 
and legislators to judges increases the power of the latter at 
the expense of the former,”120 that “[i]nterpretative authority 
cannot be wrested from the judiciary without being placed 
elsewhere,”121 and that, “[a]s presidential authority to 
interpret the Constitution wanes, judicial authority 
waxes.”122 In these places—and indeed throughout Political 
Foundations of Judicial Supremacy—it appears that 
Whittington conceives of changes in the allocation of 
interpretative power as being essentially zero-sum. 
Presidential gain is associated with an equivalent loss in 
another branch, usually the Supreme Court.  
In other words, for Whittington, changes in 
interpretative authority are transfers. Presidential 
assertions of authority do not create interpretative power, 
or destroy it, but merely cause its redistribution from one 
actor to another. To be sure, the direction of the 
redistribution is variable. In periods of reconstruction, the 
president finds it desirable to take interpretative authority 
for himself, while in other periods, he finds it desirable to 
give interpretative authority to the Court, perhaps to avoid 
blame for resolving a contentious issue, or permit his 
coalition to engage in “position taking.”123 In either case, 
however, the game of interpretative authority is clearly 
  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 74. 
 120. Id. at 84. 
 121. Id. at 22. 
 122. Id. at 287. 
 123. See id. at 84-87; cf. Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 102, at 
726-28. That it is to the president’s advantage to cede interpretative power does 
not show that the game is non-zero-sum. The dispositive matter is whether 
interpretative authority increases or decreases. What utility the president 
assigns to his interpretative authority is up to him. See RAPOPORT, supra note 
116, at 36 (“How one assigns utilities to outcomes is the decision-maker’s 
private affair.”). 
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zero-sum, or “purely competitive,” since one player’s loss is 
the other player’s gain.124 
Consider for a moment whether it is possible to play a 
non-zero-sum game of interpretative authority. This is what 
some game theorists call a game of “coordination” (as 
opposed to game of “competition”), although it is probably 
not a game of pure coordination.125 In posing this question, 
what I want to know is whether it is possible for the 
president and the Supreme Court to act in ways that 
increase the interpretative authority of both actors. It is 
tempting to suppose that such a thing must be impossible. 
After all, if the president decides on the meaning of the 
Constitution, then the Supreme Court cannot, and vice 
versa.126 But the temptation is not quite right. In another 
sense of “decide,” both the president and the Court surely 
can decide on the meaning of the Constitution. They can 
decide together. This is a thing we normally say (about 
decisions, if not constitutional ones specifically); it reflects 
the intuition that some decisions are made jointly. If, 
indeed, it is possible for the president and the Court to 
decide together on constitutional meaning, then it is 
possible to play a non-zero-sum game of interpretative 
authority. And if it is possible to play such a game, then we 
have reason to conclude that departmentalism is something 
more, or something else, than a means of presidential 
reconstruction. 
What would it mean, precisely, for the president and 
the Supreme Court to decide on constitutional meaning 
together? One possibility makes use of the idea of 
“collaboration.” In his influential study of the presidency, 
  
 124. See supra note 116 (describing these concepts). This is not to say that it 
would be impossible to model a different non-zero-sum game on Whittington’s 
account; but it would not be a game whose payoff was solely interpretative 
authority. 
 125. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 83-89 (1960). Note 
that Richard McAdams uses the expression “coordination problem” differently, 
to refer to non-trivial games of coordination, thus distinguishing the Stag Hunt, 
Battle of the Sexes, and Hawk-Dove from the non-iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
See McAdams, supra note 116, at 218-19. 
 126. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 84. 
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Edward S. Corwin argued that “departmental autonomy”—
an expression he used to describe the view that, among 
other things, each branch of the federal government should 
“be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution”—could 
result in collaborative decision-making between the 
president and Congress.127 Corwin pointed to a dispute 
between President James Monroe and Representative 
Henry Clay over the recognition of newly formed 
governments in 1820s South America. Clay had made 
several attempts in Congress to recognize governments in 
Chile and Buenos Aires. His efforts irritated some of 
Monroe’s cabinet members, who considered recognition a 
purely presidential authority. In response, Virginia 
Representative George Tucker defended Clay’s actions as 
simply an effort to communicate the congressional view of 
the matter to the president.128 And, indeed, after further 
such efforts, President Monroe delivered a message to 
Congress stating, in effect, “that the time had come to 
recognize the new republics and inviting Congress, if it 
concurred in that view, to make the necessary 
appropriations for carrying it into effect.”129  
The Clay-Monroe exchange prompted Corwin to 
remark, “[i]t is thus borne in upon one that the principle of 
departmental autonomy does not necessarily spell 
departmental conflict, but that mutual consultation and 
collaboration are quite as logical deductions from it.”130 As 
Corwin understood it, each branch, guided by its own 
understanding of the Constitution, exercised its powers in 
ways that invited responsive actions by the other, resulting 
in a collaborative policy.131 
  
 127. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 59, at 21, 205, 469 n.19. 
 128. See id. at 217 (citing VI U.S. CONGRESS & THOMAS HART BENTON, 
ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 168 (1857)). 
 129. Id. at 218 (internal citations omitted). 
 130. Id. 
 131. In this case, the policy was the object of collaboration. In other cases, 
constitutional meaning—the allocation of constitutional powers—is the object of 
collaboration. I draw no bright line between these two topics of interbranch 
collaboration. 
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This, in a nutshell, is the second of “two views of 
departmentalism.” The first view is the familiar one, based 
on the idea of interbranch competition over interpretative 
authority. The second view of departmentalism is based 
instead on the idea of interbranch collaboration. This view 
is much less familiar, but it is not unknown. 
B. The Idea of Interbranch Collaboration 
By using the term “collaboration,” I mean to invoke 
something more than the general idea of dialogue. 
Interbranch dialogue is consistent with a regime of judicial 
supremacy, as many others have shown.132 Interbranch 
collaboration, I shall argue, is a unique benefit of moderate 
departmentalism. What do I mean by “collaboration”? 
Collaboration means jointly developing a solution to a 
common problem. It involves dialogue, but more than 
dialogue. What more, precisely? Here I want to draw upon 
the model of collaboration developed in the scholarship on 
“new governance”133 or “collaborative governance.”134 This 
literature ranges widely, but, in general, it describes the 
features of what might be called “administrative 
collaboration”: collaboration between government agencies 
and business firms over the content, implementation, and 
enforcement of administrative rules. What is distinctive 
  
 132. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 18; Dorf & Friedman, supra note 18, at 62; 
see also Friedman, supra note 18. 
 133. See Lobel, supra note 21, at 344 (describing the model as decentralization 
that integrates law, economics, and critical legal scholarship, and promising 
dialogue between the interested, opposing parties); Salamon, supra note 21 
(defining its collaborative approach that acknowledges both its opportunities 
and challenges as “new governance”). 
 134. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 22 (describing the five features that 
characterize “collaborative governance”); id. at 6 (characterizing a collaborative 
administrative process as “a problem-solving exercise in which parties share 
responsibility for all stages of the rule-making process”). Incidentally, where 
this literature defines “collaboration,” the definition resembles my own. See, e.g., 
Jill Purdy, A Framework for Assessing Power in Collaborative Governance 
Processes, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 409, 409 (2012) (defining collaboration as a 
“process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can 
constructively explore their differences and search for solutions” (quoting 
BARBARA GRAY, COLLABORATING: FINDING COMMON GROUND FOR MULTIPARTY 
PROBLEMS 5 (1st ed. 1989)).  
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about this body of literature is how it reconceives of these 
processes and the relationships between agencies and firms 
embodied in them. I will describe the details of this shift in 
a moment. For now, note that one of its effects appears to be 
what I was after above: a game of cooperation. As Orly 
Lobel puts it, “[a] shift from adversarial legalism to 
collaboration entails a move from an image of win-lose 
situations to a win-win environment. All actors come to 
realize their interlocking interest in the processes of 
governance.”135  
The language is suggestive. Administrative 
collaboration promises to transform an adversarial 
encounter in which agency and firm compete over 
regulatory control into a collaborative one. To understand 
how this might be, and the implications for moderate 
departmentalism, I want to isolate two key ideas in the new 
governance literature on collaborative decision-making. I 
will use these ideas to compare administrative collaboration 
to inter-branch constitutional interpretation under a regime 
of moderate departmentalism. 
1. Administrative Collaboration: Peers and Non-
Coercion. The first idea is that collaboration involves the 
interaction of peers. Peers are equal in authority. Thus, 
administrative collaboration takes place, the literature tells 
us, within a “horizontal network[]” of public and private 
entities, rather than a vertical hierarchy of authority 
headed by the agency.136 The intended point of contrast is 
with New Deal theories of public administration.137 
  
 135. Lobel, supra note 21, at 379; see also id. at 405-06 tbl.2; Salamon, supra 
note 21, at 1633 (noting that in new governance “collaboration replaces 
competition as the defining feature of sectoral relationships”). 
 136. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., The New Governance: Practices and 
Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government, 
65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547, 547 (2005) (“[H]orizontal networks of public, private, 
and nonprofit organizations [constitute] the new structures of governance as 
opposed to hierarchical organizational decision making.”); Lobel, supra note 21, 
at 377.  
 137. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 21, at 270-72 (discussing the ineffectiveness 
of the New Deal constitutionalism and the call for decentralization and 
limitation of national authority); Freeman, supra note 21, at 3 (comparing, 
generally, the contestation of administration to that present during the New 
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Traditional theory conceived of government agencies as 
possessing complete control over the operation of their 
programs; thus, a major task of that body of theory was to 
describe how control should be exercised to accomplish 
program goals consistent with values of efficiency and 
democratic legitimacy.138 In contrast, new governance 
acknowledges that agencies have only partial control over 
their programs.139 Agencies and firms are thus 
interdependent in ways that blur the line between public 
and private orders.140 For example, government agencies 
depend on regulated entities and industry associations to 
gather information and provide feedback on policy 
effectiveness; regulated entities, in turn, depend on 
government to provide a framework of rules and institutions 
in which goods and services can profitably be delivered.141  
But agency dependence on firms and other private 
entities goes much deeper than this. Firms, industry 
associations, and public interest groups are often the source 
of the norms by which firm behavior is measured. In this 
way, interdependence gives substance to the idea that 
agencies and the firms they regulate are “peers.”142 Consider 
  
Deal); Lobel, supra note 21, at 351-54 (discussing the regulatory development of 
the New Deal and the emergence of a new paradigm).  
 138. See Salamon, supra note 21, at 1628-29 (discussing the shift “from 
hierarchic agencies to organizational networks”). 
 139. See id. 
 140. See id. at 1631 (stating that, under the network theory, “the standard 
relationship among actors is one of interdependence”); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 
21, at 354-55 (discussing the dynamic of agencies, requiring them to be 
interdependent, yet involved in the very interests they regulate); Fiorino, supra 
note 21, at 452 (finding that the complexity of the problems and the level of 
interdependence create a need for cooperation); Freeman, supra note 21, at 30 
(discussing that collaboration will involve arrangements that cross the public-
private divide).  
 141. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 21, at 317-19 (discussing the ongoing 
exchange between agency and regulated entity results in agency learning and 
collaborative development of rules); Salamon, supra note 21, at 1628-29, 1635 
(discussing the need for strong governmental involvement in the private sector). 
 142. See Lobel, supra note 21, at 425-26 (“Under such a regime, public 
authorities allow for cooperative implementation in which government relies 
upon agents or employees of the regulated entities to help interpret, implement, 
and enforce applicable rules.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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the development and enforcement of administrative rules. 
Regulated entities may be tasked with developing their own 
company-specific rules that meet general benchmarks or 
targets described by the agency.143 Such rules have the 
benefit of being appropriately tailored to the circumstances 
and business practices of the firm in question.144 Their 
content does not seem “foreign,” misconceived, or unrealistic 
to firm employees—who may, in fact, play a role in 
developing the rules.145 Firms may also enforce rules 
themselves using internal inspection procedures, backed by 
governmental audit and sanction processes.146 Sharing 
enforcement tasks may benefit all involved. Internal 
inspectors often enjoy powers considerably greater than 
government inspectors, and may be able to root out non-
compliance behaviors hidden or obscure to an outside 
observer.147  
The second key idea is that collaboration is non-coercive. 
Administrative collaboration requires both agency and firm 
to employ the techniques of obtaining freely given consent: 
negotiation and persuasion. The need for negotiation and 
persuasion follows closely from agencies’ lack of complete 
control over their regulatory programs, and their resulting 
dependence on regulated entities. As Lester Salamon 
describes the connection, “[g]iven the pervasive 
interdependence that characterizes [horizontal] networks, 
no entity . . . is in a position to enforce its will on the others 
over the long run. In these circumstances, negotiation and 
persuasion replace command and control as the preferred 
management approach.”148 Simple examples again illustrate 
the idea. Consider the task of gathering information from 
regulated entities. Accessing and analyzing firm 
  
 143. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 106-08. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. at 110 (recognizing that rules can be simple and specific, rather 
than having to account for an endless range of activities or strategies used 
industry-wide). 
 146. See id. at 35-38 (discussing sanctions and compliance); Freeman, supra 
note 21, at 30-31 (discussing a system of monitoring compliance internally). 
 147. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 104-05. 
 148. Salamon, supra note 21, at 1635 (emphasis omitted). 
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information is vital to the rule-making, implementation, 
and enforcement tasks. Yet government agencies lack the 
resources to collect and fully understand much of this 
information. As Ayres and Braithwaite report, even in cases 
like nuclear regulation, “the facts of life are that the 
wealthiest state in the world monitors only 1 or 2 percent of 
‘safety-related’ activities at nuclear plants annually.”149 To 
determine whether firms are complying with rules, 
regulators must rely on the firms themselves, as well as 
industry associations and public interest groups, to gather 
and analyze relevant information. Agencies must negotiate 
standards and protocols governing collection and access to 
such information, and must persuade firms, their 
associations, and key public interest groups to take an 
active and comprehensive approach to information-
management tasks. 
Nothing about this argument presupposes that 
regulators will be able to negotiate favorable terms or 
persuade firms to cooperate in every instance. This may 
prove difficult, or in some cases impossible. I am unaware of 
any new-governance scholars who assume that regulators 
and firms will share a basic understanding of the purposes 
of regulation or its relative importance, and will thus be 
able to “deliberate” about best rules and how to enforce 
them.150 Agencies are nonetheless often successful because 
negotiation and persuasion are desirable strategies for all 
involved. They are relatively non-invasive, and they are less 
costly for both agency and firm than adversarial measures.  
From the agency perspective, employing persuasion can 
help to develop a culture of compliance at a firm. Ayres and 
Braithwaite have shown that if regulators signal to firm 
employees that they regard them as responsible, it 
encourages employees to take a positive, public-regarding 
approach to regulatory compliance, instead of a cynical 
  
 149. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 103 (citing Peter K. 
Manning, The Limits of Knowledge: The Role of Information in Regulation, in 
MAKING REGULATORY POLICY 49 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds., 1989)). 
 150. See id. at 35-36; Dorf & Sabel, supra note 21, at 321-22 (noting that 
collaboration can aid problem-solving deliberation); Lobel, supra note 21, at 311 
(explaining how soft law allows for open communication and deliberation).  
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one.151 From the firm perspective, such a culture promotes 
lawful behavior. More broadly, the use of negotiation and 
persuasion can encourage agency and firm to approach rule-
making and enforcement with a “problem-solving” attitude, 
rather than an adversarial one—a result associated with 
reduced costs.152 
2. Comparing Administrative Collaboration and 
Moderate Departmentalism. Peer interdependence and non-
coercion suggest a natural comparison between 
administrative collaboration and departmentalism. Inter-
branch constitutional interpretation under conditions of 
moderate departmentalism exhibits both of these features. 
First, it involves peer interactions. Equality of rank, or 
branch coordinacy, was a premise in the argument above for 
moderate departmentalism. Coordinacy, it was argued, 
implies that each branch is free to exercise its powers as it 
sees fit, and, by implication, that it may interpret the 
content and scope of those powers. This autonomy—what 
Corwin called “departmental autonomy”—implies that each 
branch enjoys an imperfect control over constitutional 
meaning.153 If the president has an implied authority to 
determine for himself the meaning of “reasonable 
suspicion,” then the Supreme Court lacks complete control 
over the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the content of 
the body of fundamental law governing police practices. 
Similarly, a president who wishes to operate under a certain 
construction of the Fourth Amendment depends on the 
Supreme Court to affirm that construction in the context of 
litigation. Just as in the administrative context, incomplete 
control generates a kind of institutional “interdependence” 
among the branches. Indeed, the implication was not lost on 
the framers. As Paulsen has pointed out, James Wilson 
  
 151. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 47-51. 
 152. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 22-23; see, e.g., id. at 41-49 
(demonstrating how the EPA used negotiation and persuasion in rulemaking). 
 153. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, supra note 59, at 21, 205, 469 n.19. 
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drew much the same conclusion about the effects of 
departmental independence on the president.154 
Second, as a corollary, moderate departmentalism 
necessitates the use of non-coercive techniques of obtaining 
consent, particularly persuasion. The reasoning is much the 
same as it was in the context of administrative regulation. 
The president and the Court lack complete control over the 
determination of constitutional meaning. Each has various 
tools to encourage the other to adopt its favored 
construction, but neither will able to force its view on the 
other over the political long run.155 It appears, then, that 
under a regime of moderate departmentalism, both the 
president and the Court will need to engage in some amount 
of persuasion to achieve goals that depend on interbranch 
cooperation.156 Of course, efforts to persuade may or may not 
be successful; the branches may go their own ways. I will 
return to this point at length below. But when persuasion 
does produce a shared solution, there is some reason to 
expect the benefits of the “problem-solving” orientation 
discussed above. A solution freely chosen by both 
departments is likely to embody, to some degree, the 
understanding and priorities of each, since each will have 
had an opportunity to urge the merits of its view on the 
  
 154. Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch, supra note 13, at 239 (“Wilson 
maintained that this independence of the departments would create a mutual 
dependence (or inter-dependence), because, in the same way that each branch 
would possess autonomous power within its sphere, none of the branches would 
be bound by the ‘proceedings’ of the others.”). Viscount Bolingbroke also 
advanced a similar argument. VILE, supra note 49, at 81 (“Bolingbroke then 
presented a defence of his view that the independence of the parts of the 
government . . . was perfectly compatable with their 'mutual dependency.' The 
parts of the government have each the power to exercise some control over the 
others, and they are therefore mutually dependent."). 
 155. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 77-78 (portraying the judiciary as 
representative of outdated interests, giving a president with a mandate to 
remake politics the upper hand); SKOWRONEK, supra note 97, at 27-28 
(discussing the paradox that, for presidents, “the power to recreate order hinges 
on the authority to repudiate it”). 
 156. I do not mean to rule out negotiation, but it seems likely that negotiation 
between the Court and the other branches will almost always be tacit, due to 
the norms governing judicial decision-making and judicial ethics more broadly. 
382 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
other, and to withhold approval until the proposed solution 
reflects that perspective.157 
In these respects, then, moderate departmentalism 
resembles regulatory collaboration between agencies and 
firms. The comparison is rather straightforward. The 
Supreme Court resembles the government agency. Its 
“program” is the determination of constitutional meaning. 
Under a regime of moderate departmentalism, the Court 
lacks complete control over this program. The president is a 
regulated entity: he is subject to constitutional law. Since 
the president has equal authority to determine 
constitutional meaning, the Court must depend on him as a 
source of constitutional norms. The Court cannot force the 
president to adopt its own view of the law, at least over the 
long run. It must thus obtain his freely-given consent, 
principally by persuasion. 
3. The Effect of Moderate Departmentalism on the 
President. Consider, now, how these features of moderate 
departmentalism affect the role of the executive in 
constitutional litigation. Executive attorneys, of course, 
currently play a significant role in constitutional litigation. 
They contribute to the development, in litigation, of an 
extensive written record reflecting the executive 
understanding of the Constitution; they engage in repeated 
face-to-face deliberations with judges, other governmental 
actors, and private litigants concerning this understanding; 
and they play a role in determining the agenda of 
constitutional litigation before the Supreme Court.158 
Moderate departmentalism enhances this already 
significant role. Under a regime of moderate 
departmentalism, the president is free to issue orders that 
incorporate or ignore the Court’s determination of a point of 
constitutional law. Because moderate departmentalism is 
non-coercive in this way, it transforms the tone and function 
  
 157. See Fiorino, supra note 21, at 458-61 (describing “social learning”). 
 158. David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of 
Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the 
Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 245 
(2009) (finding that when the Court calls for the views of the SG, it is thirty-
seven times more likely to grant a cert petition). 
2013] COLLABORATIVE DEPARTMENTALISM 383 
of the adjudicative proceedings in which the executive takes 
part. The incentive of a court is to use such proceedings to 
gather information from executive attorneys about the 
president’s view of the law, and to persuade those attorneys 
of the court’s own view. The cumulative effect is to make the 
president’s participation in the interbranch constitutional 
dialogue much more meaningful.  
“Meaningful participation” transforms the relationship 
between the president and the resultant constitutional 
doctrine. To see this, consider again the basic analogy 
between the president and stakeholders in collaborative 
decision-making. The president is a stakeholder in the 
determination of constitutional meaning. An interpretation 
may limit presidential powers and make it considerably 
more difficult for the president to achieve his agenda and 
manage his political coalition. Such stakeholders, who have 
considerable risk exposure, are more likely to abide by 
decisions when they are made with their input. As Ayres 
and Braithwaite report, “considerable evidence indicates 
that participation in a decision-making process increases 
the acceptance and improves the execution of the decisions 
reached.”159 Jody Freeman explains the reasoning: “Giving 
stakeholders an opportunity to participate directly in the 
rule-making process grants them a degree of ‘ownership’ 
over a rule and increases their commitment to its successful 
implementation.”160 Meaningful participation, in the 
language of public administration, brings “buy in.”161 
  
 159. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 113 (citing Victor H. Vroom, 
Industrial Social Psychology, in V THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 196-
268 (2d ed. 1969)).  
 160. Freeman, supra note 21, at 23-24 (citing Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private 
Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 637, 658-60 (1976); see also id. at 27 (“Meaningful participation . . . gives 
[affected parties] some responsibility for the regulatory regime.”); cf. Fiorino, 
supra note 21, at 447-48 (describing the regime of “reflexive law,” which gives 
regulated parties internal incentives to comply). 
 161. Of course, the point is not limited to studies of public administration but 
is the basis of broader empirical research on adjudicative legitimacy. For an 
influential defense of the significance of participation to the legitimacy of the 
law, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94-104, 172-73 (1990) 
(arguing that procedural justice is central to the legitimacy of adjudication). 
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Participation is more likely to be “meaningful” when 
process enables a party to make its voice heard, to directly 
challenge competing views, and to object to the resulting 
decision or even decline to implement it. In the context of 
negotiated rulemaking, excessive assertions of authority by 
agency officials may lead regulated entities to conclude that 
negotiation is a sham, or “mere process,” and that the 
agency will independently decide on the appropriate rule 
itself.162 In this case, the president’s residual authority to act 
on his own view of constitutional meaning suggests that a 
rational Court will seriously consider his views, which in 
turn encourages a greater investment by the president in 
the process. If the view later announced by the Court 
expressly reflects the president’s concerns as stated on the 
record and in the public view, the president will have 
greater reason to take “ownership” over that rule. 
Consider the converse situation. A stakeholder with no 
role in making a decision in which he has considerable 
exposure is unlikely to abide by that conclusion over the 
long run.163 This is especially the case where the excluded 
party retains some discretion and has special expertise in 
the regulated area; when a situation arises in which the 
party believes that his interests (or overall social welfare) 
would be advanced by ignoring the prior decision, he will 
find little difficulty in concluding that the belief is 
justified.164 The president, of course, can call on a number of 
reasons for following such a course of action. The Court and 
the Congress are unfamiliar with the demands of 
  
 162. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 37-40 (describing the process of 
negotiated rulemaking under the federal Negotiated Rulemaking Act); id. at 27-
28 (“The administrative law landscape is littered with process reforms that have 
failed to provide meaningful participation, particularly in environmental 
decision making, because the responsible agency has reacted defensively to 
them or because public input has had little discernible impact on the way in 
which problems and solutions are conceived.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 163. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 23 & n.60. 
 164. See AYRES AND BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 104-05 (“While anyone 
telling us how to do our job is a pain in the ass, interventions from ‘outsiders’ 
are harder to take.”); cf. Salamon, supra note 21, at 1635 (arguing that, under 
the contemporary framework of administrative law, “no entity, including the 
state, is in a position to enforce its will on the others over the long run”). 
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suppressing rebellion and carrying out war, and largely 
unequipped to manage such tasks.165 Where the stakes are 
so high, the president may ignore or undermine a 
determination of constitutional meaning that he regards as 
inappropriate to his task.166 
The logic is quite different if the president has 
meaningfully participated in the process by which 
constitutional meaning was settled. Suppose the question of 
the balance of war powers between Articles I and II comes 
before the federal courts. Executive attorneys appear in the 
courts to articulate the president’s view. In the Supreme 
Court, the Solicitor General describes the view and 
responds to the concerns of the justices and other 
stakeholders (perhaps Congress). The Court, aware that the 
president may choose to go his own way, sensibly 
incorporates his views into its opinion. This undermines the 
basis cited above for the president to ignore the 
constitutional determination of another branch. The 
president can no longer complain that the rule was 
fashioned without regard for the demands imposed by 
armed conflict or other unique presidential responsibilities. 
In this way, moderate departmentalism enhances the 
authority of both the president and the Supreme Court over 
the determination of constitutional meaning. Begin with the 
president. Moderate departmentalism recognizes his 
authority to refuse to adopt a constitutional interpretation 
proffered by the Court. Since the president enjoys no such 
authority under the current regime of judicial supremacy, 
this represents an increase in authority. Now consider the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court gives up the authority 
to make final and supreme determinations of the meaning 
  
 165. The point is a common one. See, e.g., David Gray Adler, Foreign Policy 
and the Separation of Powers: The Influence of the Judiciary, in JUDGING THE 
CONSTITUTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL LAWMAKING 154, 172 (Michael W. 
McCann & Gerald L. Houseman eds., 1989) [hereinafter Adler, Foreign Policy]; 
cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 92, at 10 (“When the hour of crisis tolls, 
Congress has little incentive or capacity to enforce such attempted 
precommitments.”).  
 166. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 19, at 73 (“If the political branches strongly 
disagree with the [legally binding] judicial understanding, it will be ignored or 
distinguished or limited to its facts.”). 
386 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
of the Constitution. Yet, at the same time, the Court’s 
informal authority to pronounce constitutional rules is 
increased, since the president’s participation gives him 
reason to regard the Court’s announced rules as legitimate. 
To the extent that this legitimacy is lacking under a regime 
of judicial supremacy, this represents an increase in 
authority for the Court. Thus the total amount of 
interpretative authority is increased, rather than being 
transferred from one department to another. What we have, 
I suggest, is a model for understanding how coordinate 
departments can decide together on the meaning of the 
Constitution. 
C. Agency Powers of Enforcement, and Other Complications 
The comparison between administrative collaboration 
and moderate departmentalism is suggestive. Yet it raises a 
number of obvious questions. Consider, for example, the role 
of the agency in new governance theory. Even though 
agencies do not possess complete control over the operation 
of their programs, they possess considerable authority, and 
the use of this authority is essential, in a variety of ways, to 
the success of administrative collaboration.167 
To begin, agencies convene collaborative rulemaking 
processes. For example, under the Negotiated Rulemaking 
Act of 1990, which governs the negotiation of administrative 
rules between agencies and stakeholders, the agency itself 
determines when it is necessary to formulate a new 
administrative rule.168 If the agency plans to negotiate the 
rule with interested parties, it may appoint one of its own 
officials as “convener,” a position tasked with determining 
  
 167. There are other complicating factors beyond agency powers. For example, 
the framework of administrative law, which provides for judicial review of the 
resulting administrative rule, establishes key boundaries on agency and firm 
behavior. Public-interest groups are also key players and may prevent 
cooperation from evolving into agency capture. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra 
note 21, at 54-60. 
 168. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 563(a) (2006) 
(“Determination of Need for Negotiated Rulemaking Committee”); see also 
Freeman, supra note 21, at 38 (discussing the process behind formulating a new 
rule).  
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who should be invited to participate in the negotiation.169 
After consulting with regulated entities, industry groups, 
public interest groups, and various other entities, the 
convener establishes an agenda for negotiation.170 These 
controls give the agency tremendous influence over the 
content and tone of the negotiation—factors essential to 
successful collaboration.171 As one might expect, it also falls 
to agency officials to facilitate deliberations by encouraging 
stakeholders to actively participate and to invest in the 
process.172 Agencies also provide the forum within which 
collaboration can take place. This means at least a physical 
setting where parties can meet and deliberate, face-to-face, 
over an extended period of time. The point is not a 
superficial one; research supports the conclusion that 
extended face-to-face interaction encourages parties to take 
a cooperative, problem-solving stance towards dispute 
resolution, whereas the exchange of a paper record is 
associated with excessively adversarial behavior and 
posturing.173 
It is in enforcement, however, that government agencies 
play their most important role. This point is not lost on new 
governance scholars, despite their well-known support of 
self-enforcement processes.174 Ayres and Braithwaite 
observe “a long history of barren disputation” between those 
  
 169. 5 U.S.C. § 563(b); Freeman, supra note 21, at 38 (citing NEGOTIATED 
RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK 123-31 (David M. Pritzker & Deborah S. Dalton eds., 
1995)). 
 170. Freeman, supra note 21, at 38. 
 171. See, e.g., Purdy, supra note 134, at 411. 
 172. See Freeman, supra note 21, at 37-38.  
 173. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 91 (“Empirically, there can 
be no doubt that dialogue transforms the nature of regulatory encounters.”); 
Freeman, supra note 21, at 22-24; Lobel, supra note 21, at 383; see also Chris 
Huxham & Siv Vangen, Leadership in the Shaping and Implementation of 
Collaboration Agendas: How Things Happen in a (Not Quite) Joined-Up World, 
2000 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1159, 1170-71 (2000) (noting the effect of face-to-face 
contact on environmental partnership). 
 174. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 19-53 (discussing the 
importance of strong punishment to promote self-enforcement); Freeman, supra 
note 21, at 32.; cf. Fiorino, supra note 21, at 456 (explaining the need for agency 
independence). 
388 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
who—unlike themselves—believe that “gentle persuasion 
works in securing business compliance with the law,” and 
those who—also unlike themselves—treat firms like bad 
actors and expect their compliance “only when confronted 
with tough sanctions.”175 The new governance strategy is to 
transcend this debate by describing enforcement processes 
that mix strategies of persuasion and sanction.176 Thus, 
according to Ayres and Braithwaite, building on work by 
John Scholz, agencies should employ a tit-for-tat 
enforcement strategy in which firm non-compliance is met 
with an escalating series of sanctions, graded appropriately 
to the severity and degree of noncompliance.177 The 
concomitant distribution of enforcement practices can be 
represented as a layered “enforcement pyramid”: at the base 
of the pyramid, the thickest layer (and thus the activity 
most often engaged in) is persuasion, on top of which lie 
successively smaller layers of increasingly severe 
sanctions.178 Instrumental to the solution is the existence, at 
the very top of the pyramid, of a “benign big gun.” The big 
gun is an “enormous” agency power, such as the ability to 
revoke a firm license or shutter a business.179  Although 
empirical studies suggest that agencies rarely use big guns 
(thus they are “benign”), the existence of such a power 
affects other, lesser agency powers.180 According to Ayres 
and Braithwaite, the greater the sanction available to an 
agency, the more the agency will be able to “push regulation 
down to the cooperative base of the [enforcement] pyramid,” 
and thus employ enforcement strategies like persuasion.181 
Indeed, some kind of significant sanction is necessary if 
firms are to consistently adopt a public-regarding approach 
  
 175. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 20. 
 176. Id. at 21. 
 177. Id. at 20-21, 35-40. Tit-for-tat is a strategy in an iterated game, in which 
a player initially cooperates, but then defects if the other player defects. See 
John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 LAW & 
POL’Y 385, 392-93 (1984). 
 178. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 35-36. 
 179. Id. at 40. 
 180. Id. at 40-41. 
 181. Id. at 40-44. 
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to regulatory enforcement, rather than a narrowly self-
interested one: “[W]ithout the spectre of sanctions in the 
background, . . . social responsibility concerns would not 
occupy the foreground of our deliberation.”182  
These differences threaten to undermine the very 
simple comparison drawn above between administrative 
collaboration and moderate departmentalism. Specifically, 
the absence of a judicial “big gun” suggests that, under a 
regime of moderate departmentalism, the president has 
little reason to abide by rules announced by the Court if 
they do not advance his interests. It is to this objection that 
I turn in the remainder of this Article. My strategy will be 
to argue that, despite the differences canvassed above, the 
Supreme Court does have a kind of judicial “big gun.” 
Avoiding this sanction encourages the president to 
participate with the Court in constitutional interpretation 
and to comply with its results. 
D. The Rationality of Constitutional Collaboration 
We can begin to consider why, under moderate 
departmentalism, the president would adopt an unfriendly 
constitutional rule by drawing on a body of scholarship that 
considers why political actors ever voluntarily comply with 
adjudication.183 It is usually supposed that political actors 
comply with the exercise of judicial power because they 
respect formal constitutional and statutory boundaries. But 
  
 182. Id. at 47. 
 183. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 12; Graber, Establishing Judicial 
Review?, supra note 30; Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 30; 
David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723 
(2009); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in 
an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J. L. & ECON. 875 (1975); Levinson, Parchment 
and Politics, supra note 102, at 658, 661; McAdams, supra note 116, at 239-41, 
248-49; Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1043 (2005) [hereinafter McAdams, Expressive power of 
Adjudication]; J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A 
Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994); Matthew C. Stephenson, 
“When the Devil Turns . . .”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial 
Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 62-63 (2003); Barry R. Weingast, The Political 
Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245 
(1997). 
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a little reflection suggests the answer is incomplete.184 For it 
is not obvious why powerful political actors would obey 
formal legal boundaries when doing so handicaps them. The 
judiciary cannot compel their obedience; it is the political 
actors who control the powers of sanction. As Matthew 
Stephenson put it in a now oft-quoted line, “[w]hy would 
people with money and guns ever submit to people armed 
only with gavels?”185 
The answer proposed by this line of scholarship is that 
obeying formal constitutional boundaries actually benefits 
political actors. Compliance enables political actors to 
advance their agenda—for example, by achieving a policy 
result or satisfying the demands of a lobbyist or coalition 
member. Recall Keith Whittington’s argument that a 
president might transfer interpretative authority back to 
the judiciary to avoid blame for resolving a politically 
divisive issue.186 Delegation thus advances, not harms, the 
interests of political actors; it allows them to preserve their 
own popularity and prevent the fracture of their political 
coalition.187 
Other arguments make use of the logic of coordination. 
For example, building on an earlier model described by 
Barry Weingast, David Law has recently argued that 
judicial review solves a coordination problem associated 
with the popular control of governmental actors.188 
Coordination problems are what I called above “non-zero-
sum” games of strategy; they are games in which both 
players stand to benefit if they can settle on the right 
combination of moves. According to Law, all forms of 
representative constitutional government pose such a 
  
 184. For a recent account of the explanatory deficit, see Levinson, Parchment 
and Politics, supra note 102, at 659-61. 
 185. Stephenson, supra note 183, at 60. 
 186. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, and accompanying text. 
 187. See Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 30, at 37-45; 
Stephenson, supra note 183, at 62-63. 
 188. See Law, supra note 183, at 723; see also Weingast, supra note 183, at 
246-52. 
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problem.189 The interests of political actors diverge from the 
interests of citizens, and this divergence can lead political 
actors to exceed or abuse their grants of power. Yet a citizen 
who tries on his own to enforce constitutional boundaries 
against the government is likely to pay a very high cost for 
doing so (and be unsuccessful), while working together will 
produce success at much lower a cost.190 This suggests that 
individuals will resist unconstitutional action only if they 
expect other individuals to resist, and expect that other 
individuals expect the same of them. Judicial decisions 
create such expectations by “generating common beliefs and 
common knowledge about both the constitutionality of 
government conduct and the ways in which other citizens 
will react.”191 Courts thus enable citizens to coordinate their 
responses to governmental action.192 
These ideas pose two important questions for my 
defense of moderate departmentalism: (1) Does moderate 
departmentalism provide the president any strategic 
reasons to comply with constitutional rules announced by 
the Supreme Court, even if they are unfriendly? If so, then 
we can answer the skepticism, expressed above, that the 
president would ever comply with such rules. (2) Does 
moderate departmentalism interfere with the strategic 
benefits associated with judicial review under a regime of 
judicial supremacy? In other words, is judicial supremacy 
an assumption in the accounts offered by Whittington, 
Graber, Law, Weingast, and others? 
  
 189. See Law, supra note 183, at 730-31 (citing Martin Shapiro, The Success of 
Judicial Review and Democracy, in MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON 
LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 149, 182 (2002)). 
 190. See Weingast, supra note 183, at 247-48. 
 191. Law, supra note 183, at 732; cf. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, 
Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 999 (2008) [hereinafter 
Posner & Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns]; David A. Strauss, Common 
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 910-19 (1996). More 
specifically, court judgments create a “focal point” by signaling the existence of a 
constitutional violation. 
 192. For other examples of this kind of argument, see Levinson, Parchment 
and Politics, supra note 102, at 708-10, and McAdams, Expressive Power of 
Adjudication, supra note, 183, at 1074-80. 
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It is to these questions that I turn below. In taking up 
these issues, I do not assume that the logic described in the 
previous Part—the president’s meaningful participation in 
the determination of constitutional meaning—is insufficient 
to explain his voluntarily compliance with constitutional 
rules announced by the Supreme Court. Indeed, I argued 
above that, as an empirical matter, meaningful 
participation in the formulation of a rule makes it more 
likely that one will freely comply with it.193 This is the case 
even when resultant rules come at significant cost to the 
actor in question.194 Yet this cannot, and should not, be the 
whole of the case for moderate departmentalism. As Ayres 
and Braithwaite have persuasively argued, the best 
regulatory enforcement strategies are dynamic; they 
recognize that a plurality of considerations influence 
individual decisions—legal, moral, and strategic—and adapt 
in response to individual choices.195 Firm leaders, the 
authors suggest, have “multiple selves”: they are profit-
maximizers, perfectionists about their products or services, 
law-abiders, and so on.196 We hope that firm personnel will 
respond to regulators with their best, most public-regarding 
selves—but we know it may not come to pass. I assume that 
presidents are much the same, and, thus, that moderate 
departmentalism must support a dynamic strategy of 
“constitutional enforcement.” It must be prepared for the 
multiple selves of the modern American president. 
1. Strategic Compliance Under Moderate 
Departmentalism. It has long been understood that the logic 
of repeat play is central to voluntary compliance with the 
  
 193. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 113. 
 194. See Frederick Schauer, When and How (If at All) Does Law Constrain 
Official Action?, 44 GA. L. REV. 759, 780-81 (2010); cf. TYLER, supra note 161, at 
94-105. 
 195. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 21, at 35-47. 
 196. See id. at 19-20; see also Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, 
Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 
1519 (2000) (“Individuals have multiple conflicting identities, both collective and 
individual. Sometimes individual members of a group act in accordance with a 
decision frame in which they regard themselves as ‘I’s rather than as ‘we.’ . . . 
[W]e observe far more cooperation and successful collective action than can be 
explained by rational choice theory.”). 
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law.197 In 1984, John Scholz modeled what he called the 
“enforcement dilemma” as a prisoners’ dilemma-type game 
between regulators and firms. The game works as follows. 
Regulator and firm are each given the choice of cooperating 
or defecting. In the case of the regulator, defection means 
“harassing” the firm; and in the case of the firm, it means 
evading the regulator.198 Payoffs in the game follow the 
distribution of the prisoners’ dilemma. The firm pays the 
highest compliance costs if it cooperates but the regulator 
harasses; and the lowest costs if it evades and the regulator 
cooperates. The regulator obtains the least pollution 
reduction (for example) if it cooperates but the firm evades; 
and the greatest reduction if it harasses and the firm 
cooperates. This distribution, of course, makes mutual 
cooperation impossible. The firm’s best strategy (for 
reducing costs) is to evade, whatever the regulator does; and 
the regulator’s best strategy (for reducing pollution) is to 
harass, whatever the firm does. The equilibrium is thus 
harassment and evasion. Meanwhile, the optimal strategy—
mutual cooperation—is impossible, at least on the 
assumptions of the game.199  
All this is changed by repeat play. Repeat play requires 
one to consider the prospect of future payoffs. Since players 
in future rounds may consider the choices made now, one’s 
present choice can affect future payoffs. Thus, future 
payoffs matter to rational actors’ present choices. If the 
present value of future cooperative payoffs is higher than 
the firm’s payoff from evading in the present round, then it 
will be rational for the firm to cooperate. Indeed, it can be 
demonstrated that if the agency adopts a reciprocal 
strategy, such as tit-for-tat (cooperate as long as the other 
  
 197. See, e.g., Scholz, supra note 177. For an example in the separation of 
powers context, see Ramseyer, supra note 183, at 722. 
 198. More precisely, Scholz called the evasion payoff for the firm “temptation,” 
see Scholz, supra note 177, at 389, but “temptation” is a term sometimes used to 
refer to any defection strategy associated with a high individual payoff. I 
therefore use the term “evasion,” which naturally calls to mind a familiar firm 
behavior in the face of regulation. 
 199. See id. at 390; see also McAdams, supra note 116, at 215-16. One of the 
assumptions of the game is that each player will act rationally, given their 
interests. In an actual encounter, of course, this may not be the case.  
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player does), a firm can guarantee itself a higher long-term 
payoff by cooperating every round than by using any 
strategy involving evasion.200 In this way, repeated 
interactions make voluntary cooperation possible. 
We can use the idea of repeat play to show why it is 
rational, under a system of moderate departmentalism, for 
the president to voluntarily comply with unfriendly 
constitutional rules. Suppose the president meaningfully 
participates in an interbranch process of constitutional 
interpretation, as described above, and that the Court 
announces a constitutional rule unfriendly to his interests. 
Suppose further the president’s participation in the process 
does not lead him to adopt the Court’s view. Even so—even 
where the president is, on balance, unmoved by his 
participation in the interpretative process—he must still 
consider the prospect of future interbranch relations. 
Voluntarily complying with a constitutional rule announced 
by the Supreme Court will affect the president’s future 
interactions with the Court, the Congress, and the people, 
and will affect the benefits he can hope to obtain from these 
future interactions. 
The core idea can be developed in a number of ways, but 
here are two specific future consequences that a rational 
president will consider. First, ignoring the Supreme Court 
may produce a higher-order conflict the president will lose. 
Simply ignoring an opinion of the Supreme Court is likely to 
generate litigation, which could result in an order from a 
federal court reflecting the Supreme Court’s previously 
expressed views. Ignoring that order would touch off a 
higher-order dispute about the presidential power to ignore 
valid court orders—a dispute in which the president is 
unlikely to prevail. As I will explain below, the shift to the 
higher-order dispute reproduces something like the dynamic 
of Ayres and Braithwaite’s “enforcement pyramid.” Second, 
  
 200. See Scholz, supra note 177, at 392-93. Certain conditions must obtain. 
Principally, the value of the future cooperative payoffs must exceed the value of 
the present payoff associated with harassment or evasion. See id. at 392. The 
game must also continue indefinitely. See RAPOPORT, supra note 116, at 131-32. 
And there must be no ambiguity about what counts as cooperation. See 
Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 102, at 685. 
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even if the matter on which the Court announces an 
unfriendly rule is crucially important to the president, he 
may ultimately gain by voluntarily accepting the 
construction of the Court. In a political regime where 
legitimacy can enhance constitutional authority, engaging 
in deliberation and freely complying with its results can 
enhance the reputational authority of the complying actor. 
It thus makes future benefits possible that might be 
impossible otherwise. 
a. Higher-Order Conflict. Imagine the following case. 
The president interprets a statute authorizing indefinite 
military detentions of enemy combatants as impliedly 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus.201 The statute 
provides for an administrative determination of combatant 
status, but no opportunity to subsequently challenge the 
determination by presenting evidence or confronting 
witnesses. After the president announces his view, an 
enemy combatant held pursuant to the law petitions a 
federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging 
his detention. The district court denies the petition and the 
denial is upheld on appeal, but the Supreme Court reverses 
the decision, holding that the statute in question did not 
suspend habeas, and that the combatants are entitled to a 
more extensive legal process for challenging the status 
determination. On remand, the district court grants the 
petition and executive officers comply with the court’s 
orders.  
Now imagine that the president refuses to comply with 
future court orders based on the Supreme Court’s decision, 
citing his disagreement with the Court’s construction of the 
statute, constitutional law, and the crucial national 
interests at stake.202 Consider the president’s options in 
such a case. If a district court issues a writ of habeas 
corpus, the president may appeal the order, but he is likely 
to lose in the court of appeals, which is bound by the same 
precedent as the district court. He may then seek a writ of 
  
 201. Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (discussing a similar set of 
facts). 
 202. See Easterbrook, supra note 31, at 926 & n.57 (acknowledging this 
possibility). 
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certiorari from the Supreme Court, but given the Court’s 
recent determination of the issue, the writ is unlikely to be 
granted.203 If the president refuses to enforce the habeas 
writ on remand from the court of appeals, the petitioner will 
ask the district court to enforce it. 
At this point, the picture doesn’t look good for the 
president. Absent extraordinary political circumstances, it 
seems unlikely that the president will be able to simply 
refuse the orders of the district court to enforce the writ. 
Crucially, the issue at this point becomes entirely general: 
the question is whether the president has the duty to 
execute valid orders with which he disagrees. Nearly all 
scholars of presidential power agree that he has such an 
obligation.204 Moreover, even if the president were to succeed 
in persuading the Supreme Court to issue a writ of 
certiorari, he would be faced with the task of persuading the 
Court to give up a rule it had, ex hypothesi, only just 
announced. Without a strong reason for urging the Court to 
reverse itself, he is unlikely to succeed.205 If he knows he is 
unlikely to succeed, he is unlikely to try.206 
This is what I call the case of higher-order conflict. 
Where the president’s interpretation of the Constitution can 
give rise to litigation, simply ignoring a recent decision of 
  
 203. A “straight deny” would be most likely. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (explaining 
none of the criteria for certiorari would exist in a suit concerning an issue that 
has just been resolved by the Court). But see Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. 
Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1115 (1988) (when federal government petitions, cert is 
“significantly more likely”); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court 
Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 750-51 (2001) (finding a 
positive correlation between grant of cert and the import of the issue in the case, 
such as “‘core’ governmental powers”). 
 204. Post & Siegel, supra note 16, at 1033.  
 205. In this respect, Barry Friedman’s account of the “constitutional dialogue” 
that followed Roe v. Wade feels somewhat forced; for surely, under a regime of 
judicial supremacy, the dialogue would not have permitted Congress to reject 
the reasoning of the Supreme Court, as President Reagan in fact urged it to do. 
See Friedman, supra note 18, at 661-68. To be sure, even under a regime of 
departmentalism, the states would not be authorized to disregard a decision of 
the Supreme Court—I am not defending nullification or “state review.” 
 206. Cf. Posner & Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, supra note 191, at 
1009. 
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the Supreme Court is likely to result in litigation the 
president will lose. The president will then be tasked with 
making the general case that he can ignore court orders, 
and this will be extremely difficult to do. Given this array of 
options, the president is unlikely to ignore the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Constitution where doing so 
creates a justiciable case or controversy. It risks creating a 
higher-order conflict he cannot win. 
One response to my argument might be the following: 
“Even if you are right about this, I don’t see the advantage 
over judicial supremacy with respect to limiting the exercise 
of executive power. Isn’t the result just the same? Isn’t the 
president already required to abide by the Court’s view of 
the Constitution? You would just be creating more 
litigation, which is the last thing we need. We’d also be left 
with many more judicial opinions to make sense of. In fact, 
wouldn’t the result be a kind of ‘pointillist’ body of 
precedent governing executive power?207 How is that 
desirable?” 
It is indeed correct that departmentalism of the variety 
I defend here is not far from judicial supremacy. As long as 
we keep intact the general obligation for the president to 
comply with valid legal judgments, we will not end up with 
an executive branch bound only by political forces.208 But 
this is a strength of the account, not a weakness. It shows 
that moderate departmentalism is hardly a radical position. 
Moreover, my opponent’s response is incorrect in the 
following sense: there is a beneficial difference between the 
departmentalism described above and a regime of judicial 
supremacy. The difference is easiest to see if we focus on the 
question of when the president is likely to seek, and likely 
to obtain, a writ of certiorari in a case putatively governed 
by a recent decision of the Supreme Court. The president 
will be likely to seek a writ, and likely to obtain it, if he can 
convince the Court that they were mistaken, for some 
reason, about their recent construction of the Constitution. 
The easiest way to succeed in this effort is surely to show 
  
 207. The analogy is due to Post & Siegel, supra note 16, at 1040-41. 
 208. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 92, at 3-18. 
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the Court that it has been factually mistaken about a matter 
of executive power—not that the Court has been legally 
mistaken, since the Court is (and regards itself as being) 
highly conversant in the governing law and is therefore 
unlikely to abandon a construction so soon after announcing 
it. In contrast, a focus on factual mistake advantages the 
executive where the matter lies within its expertise, such as 
the conduct of foreign relations, hostilities, or the execution 
of the law. After all, the Court has, of its own avail, 
developed a body of law limiting its ability to hear cases on 
such questions in light of, among other things, a purported 
lack of competence.209 The president is thus incentivized to 
seek review of a recent decision by the Court where, in light 
of his office, he can provide critical insight on the Court’s 
construction of the law—for example, by drawing on a 
feature of the conduct of hostilities overlooked or distorted 
by the Court. In this way, departmentalism incentivizes the 
president to act on his own views of the Constitution when 
he has strong, objective reasons to think the Court is 
mistaken on a matter within his bailiwick.210 
Where the president judges that he will be unable to 
prevail in either litigation over the underlying substantive 
issue or a collateral enforcement proceeding, he will be 
unlikely to simply ignore the recently announced view of the 
Supreme Court. There is no reason to suppose a president 
with finite resources and a limited political “warrant” will 
seek out higher-order conflicts he is unable to win.211 And 
surely he will be unable to win in most cases—which is to 
say, surely, in most cases, the president will be without a 
convincing, objective argument that (1) the Supreme Court’s 
  
 209. See Adler, Foreign Policy, supra note 165, at 168-70. 
 210. In this way, moderate departmentalism would effect an executive version 
of the “judicial second-look” doctrine described by Neil Katyal. See Katyal, supra 
note 17, at 1359-60. 
 211. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 18-21 (describing the 
presidential task of achieving imperatives in the face of a variety of significant 
constraints). Note that the president’s political warrant is limited in more 
dimensions than quantity; as Skowronek has explained, the president’s 
warrant, or authority, is premised on a particular relationship to the extant 
regime. Warrants are thus imbued with a particular message. Certain messages 
make it difficult for the president to broadly contest the authority of the courts. 
2013] COLLABORATIVE DEPARTMENTALISM 399 
articulation of the law reflects a factual mistake about a 
matter within his executive expertise; or, (2) even if the 
Court did not clearly make a mistake, it should not interfere 
with the president for some more general reason. The 
implication is that the president will freely comply with the 
Court’s view in most cases. This is why a “pointillist” body 
of law will not evolve. 
In this way, repeat play transforms the logic of the 
president’s decision about whether to comply with an 
unfriendly constitutional rule announced by the Supreme 
Court. Where the Court’s views bind lower courts (“vertical” 
stare decisis), the president can count on repeated litigation 
if he ignores the Court’s view. Such litigation imposes costs 
on the president. A rational President will consider the 
avoidance of future costs in presently deciding whether to 
voluntarily comply. Moreover, there is a dynamic quality to 
the encounter between the president and the courts, since 
repeated litigation potentially transforms the nature and 
significance of the dispute. The longer the president insists 
on refusing to comply with the rule announced by the Court, 
the greater the possibility that the dispute transforms into 
one in which the president appears to challenge judicial 
power simpliciter. Such a conflict will impose significant 
political costs on the president. Perhaps the best known 
example of this result is the political effect of Roosevelt’s 
court-packing plan,212 but more recent presidents have also 
mismanaged disagreements with the Court, causing them to 
metastasize.213 Moreover, higher-order disputes tend to give 
rise to broader and deeper exercises of the judicial power. 
Courts can change the scope of the orders they enter. 
Compare the judicial order resolving initial litigation, which 
concerns the parties and the subject matter of their dispute, 
with the judicial order in a higher-order dispute, which 
  
 212. See Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 
2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 130-32 (2010). 
 213. Consider, for example, the costs suffered by President George W. Bush in 
repeated conflicts with the courts over the rights of those detained during the 
so-called “war on terror.” See Johnsen, supra note 8, at 395 (“President George 
W. Bush and his executive branch lawyers have earned widespread and often 
scathing criticism for their extreme positions and practices regarding the scope 
of presidential authority.”). 
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concerns the very exercise of executive power and may 
affect executive officers beyond those involved in the initial 
litigation. In this way, “vertical” stare decisis transforms 
specific disputes into more general ones. 
What we have before us, I argue, is the “big gun” of the 
judiciary under a regime of moderate departmentalism. 
Because a rational president will avoid higher-order 
conflicts, the big gun is likely to be “benign,” just as it was 
in the regulatory context.214 Avoiding such conflicts 
incentivizes the president to comply even with unfriendly 
constitutional rules announced by the Court.215 The 
regulatory logic thus plays out to the same effect: the 
existence of the big gun incentives the president to 
voluntarily adopt the Court’s constitutional rule, creating a 
kind of “enforcement pyramid,” in which the more severe 
sanctions are relatively rare, and most “enforcement” takes 
place through “persuasion” (the voluntary adoption of the 
Court’s interpretation).  
b. The Appearance of Legitimacy. We are considering 
the effect of repeat play on the president’s voluntary 
compliance with unfriendly constitutional rules. We have 
seen how the present value of future conflicts affects the 
president’s choice of whether to comply. There is a second 
mechanism, as well, through which repeat play can affect 
the president’s present choice: reputation. 
As I am using it here, the logic of reputation is 
concerned with repeated games involving different 
partners.216 Recall Scholz’s “enforcement dilemma” described 
above. Imagine now that the game repeats, but that 
multiple firms are involved. In the first game, the regulator 
must choose whether to cooperate or harass, and the firm 
must choose whether to cooperate or evade. In the second 
round, a second firm must choose whether to cooperate or 
  
 214. See supra notes 187-89, and accompanying text. 
 215. See discussion supra Part II.C and accompanying notes. 
 216. With some modification, I am following the development of this idea in 
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 106 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 
1990).  
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evade; and in the third round, a third firm; and so on. To 
say that we are dealing with a repeated game, rather than a 
series of discrete games, is to say that each firm has 
knowledge of how the regulator treated previous firms. 
Imagine, now, that each firm employs the following 
strategy: cooperate with the regulator if it has a perfect track 
record of cooperating, and otherwise evade. If we suppose 
that the regulator begins with perfect track record—a 
perfect “reputation,” if you will—then the first firm will 
cooperate rather than evade. The regulator will cooperate if 
the present value of future cooperation is sufficiently high. 
Reputation thus makes it possible to sustain a strategy of 
mutual cooperation between the regulator and different 
firms.217 
Now consider the effect of the president’s reputation on 
his interaction with the Supreme Court.218 As Daryl 
Levinson has recently observed, reputation gives political 
actors a reason to comply with formal constitutional 
constraints.219 Here the idea is slightly different, since by 
assumption the president is authorized to reject 
constitutional interpretations advanced by the Court. 
Nevertheless, where the president engages the Court in 
public argument about the meaning of the Constitution, but 
the Court is generally thought to have of the better 
argument, he violates a norm of constitutional government if 
he nonetheless refuses to voluntarily comply.220 This 
imposes a reputational cost. 
  
 217. See id. Note we need not assume that a regulatory agency is controlled by 
the same personnel over the course of repeated games. See id. at 108-11 
(detailing reputation and multiple ownership of a business firm). 
 218. The case of the president is significantly different from the example. We 
have been analogizing the president to the firm, not the regulator. So we are not 
dealing with a multiple-firm repeated game. Rather, we are contemplating that 
there is one firm that will, in effect, play repeated games with a variety of 
entities, and that those entities will be aware of the firm’s reputation from its 
games with the regulator. 
 219. Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 102, at 685, 711. 
 220. I have deliberately not specified who is judging the Court to have 
prevailed in argument against the president. Fill in whom you like. Perhaps it is 
“the people,” “the elites,” or “other governmental actors.” I don’t think the choice 
matters much here. 
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Let me elaborate. I begin with a basic idea: in our 
political system, prevailing in free deliberation among 
equals enhances the legitimacy of one’s actions. This is not 
to say that political legitimacy depends on the ability to 
prevail in free deliberation; legitimacy presumably turns on 
many factors. The relative weighting of those factors may be 
context-dependent or tiered in some way. (In some cases, I 
imagine, the loser in free deliberation may enjoy a greater 
political legitimacy than his opponent.) Nor is this to say 
that prevailing in free deliberation constitutes, or creates, 
political legitimacy. In my usage, legitimacy is not a binary 
value but an indefinite one. Prevailing in deliberation 
enhances legitimacy in the sense that it increases the 
measure of propriety associated with the governmental 
action subject to debate. That, more or less, is all I want to 
assume. 
In a regime where this is true—where prevailing in free 
deliberation among equals enhances political legitimacy—
there are reasons to freely comply with the perceived results 
of a deliberative exchange, even if one does not prevail. This 
is a result of the enhanced legitimacy enjoyed by the 
prevailing opponent. If prevailing in deliberation enhances 
legitimacy, complying with the course of conduct defended 
by the prevailing party permits the complying party to 
share in the enhanced legitimacy. Since he acts just as the 
prevailing party suggested, the complier enjoys the 
increased measure of propriety won by prevailing party. 
This encourages opposed political actors to seek out 
deliberative exchange as a means of resolving legal 
disagreements, since they have an expectation that 
participants will bind themselves according to the results.221 
The president thus can increase the likelihood of systemic 
cooperation by publicly, clearly, and voluntarily complying 
with unfriendly rules announced by the Supreme Court. 
Conversely, when the president refuses to abide by a 
prevailing constitutional rule, it discourages other political 
actors from seeking out future deliberative exchanges. His 
  
 221. See Levinson, Parchment and Politics, supra note 102 (applying similar 
logic to explain compliance with electoral outcomes by the loser). 
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tarnished outcome forecloses future beneficial outcomes 
that depend on mutual cooperation. 
We can refine this argument by contrasting the 
reputational benefits of voluntary compliance with the now-
familiar technique of blame avoidance, as practiced under a 
regime of judicial supremacy.222 Blame avoidance is a tactic 
of Skowronek’s “affiliated” president, who attempts to 
preserve his political coalition by relegating divisive issues 
to the Supreme Court.223 Litigation is brought to the Court, 
the Court weighs in, and the president declares he is bound 
by its holding—whatever his personal beliefs on the matter 
happen to be. The best example of the tactic, at least in 
recent memory, is abortion.224 But as the example suggests, 
the technique is rarely successful, at least over the long run. 
The Court’s ability to resolve highly charged issues—issues 
that truly divide the public and the governing coalition—is 
limited. It has no special ability to broker political 
compromises. Its decision inflames the losers, who have a 
strong incentive to charge the Court with politicking, 
thereby recalling the issue to the arena of political 
dispute.225 (Their case, moreover, is strong.) At the same 
time, the Court incurs reputational costs by attempting to 
resolve a highly charged matter using the blunderbuss 
techniques of legal reasoning.226 
For its part, departmentalism limits the president’s 
ability to engage in blame avoidance. A president with equal 
authority to interpret the Constitution cannot claim to have 
his hands tied by the Court’s determination of 
constitutional meaning. Executive interpretations of the 
Constitution are “traceable” to the president. There are 
obvious advantages to this state of affairs. First, it permits 
  
 222. See, e.g., Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 30, at 37-45.  
 223. SKOWRONEK, supra note 97; see discussion supra Part II.A. 
 224. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 66-67; Graber, The Nonmajoritarian 
Difficulty, supra note 30, at 40. 
 225. See, e.g., BURT, supra note 18, at 33, 353-54; Graber, The 
Nonmajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 30, at 42. 
 226. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 12, at 69-70 (describing the politicization of 
the judiciary by a reconstructive president). 
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the public to determine more easily who is accountable for a 
specific government policy. Second, it lowers the 
reputational costs to the Court associated with an attempt 
to resolve a politically divisive issue using the techniques of 
legal reasoning. This is because, once blame avoidance is 
undermined, fewer such issues will be relegated to the 
Court; and because the Court’s decision will have a much 
narrower impact—the Court won’t be capable of resolving 
the issue entirely. 
A third advantage is that departmentalism leaves the 
president with those avoidance techniques whose effects are 
more salutary and encourage him to genuinely engage the 
issue at hand. Consider how the president might go about 
adopting the Supreme Court’s resolution of a divisive issue. 
He cannot claim his hands are tied. Rather, he has two 
options. The president must either defend the Court’s 
supremacy to determine this particular constitutional 
rule—say, because it pertains to a matter uniquely within 
the Court’s expertise, such as a rule of legal procedure or a 
protection afforded criminal defendants in the courtroom—
or, he must adopt the Court’s view as his own by defending 
the view on its merits. In doing the former, the president is 
still attempting to place responsibility for governmental 
conduct on a divisive issue with the Court; but he does so 
freely, because it properly belongs with the Court as the 
institution of government best suited to resolve the issue. 
Moreover, the president cannot simply assert this; he will 
have to defend the assertion, since political opponents will 
disagree that the matter was best resolved by the Court. 
Where the president chooses instead to defend the Court’s 
view on its merits, he must embrace the substance of the 
view as his own, and in doing so he can claim the strategic 
advantages of complying with the rule of law. Where he 
chooses to disagree, he must best the Court on its terms, 
and face the political consequences of staking out his own 
position. 
By controlling blame avoidance, moderate 
departmentalism increases the accountability of the 
president and places greater emphasis on the interbranch 
interpretative process. Giving this process pride of place 
further increases the president’s stake in constitutional 
collaboration, and thus the future benefits available with an 
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untarnished reputation. Thus there is something like a 
feedback effect. 
2. Strategic Compliance Under Judicial Supremacy. 
Preventing higher-order conflict and preserving a positive 
reputation are two reasons the president should voluntarily 
comply with unfriendly constitutional rules. They are 
“strategic benefits,” as it were, of moderate 
departmentalism. But what about the costs? Are there 
strategic reasons to comply with judicial rulings unique to a 
regime of judicial supremacy? Of course, judicial supremacy 
supposes that the president is already obligated to adopt the 
constitutional rules announced by the Supreme Court, since 
the Court is the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning. 
Yet as we have seen, it is puzzling why powerful political 
actors would comply with such rules, given the actors’ 
monopoly over governmental force. 
It seems clear that moderate departmentalism would 
affect the current logic of voluntary compliance, but how it 
would do so is not entirely clear. Some strategic 
considerations would be unaffected; not all of the work on 
voluntary compliance with the exercise of judicial power is 
premised on judicial supremacy. For example, drawing on 
work by Mark Ramseyer and Barry Weingast, Matthew 
Stephenson argues that parties comply with judicial review 
because it allows them to reduce risks associated with 
political competition.227 In particular, argues Stephenson, 
judicial review requires the party in power to sacrifice some 
policy objectives, which is presently beneficial to that party 
because it will lose power in some future period.228 Note that 
the assumption of political competitiveness alone does not 
support judicial review. Ideally, political parties in a 
competitive system could simply agree to exercise a degree 
of constraint when in power.229 Parties could then employ a 
reciprocal strategy, like those outlined in the repeated 
games above, in order to sustain the mutual restraint of 
  
 227. Stephenson, supra note 183, at 63-64; see also Ramseyer, supra note 183, 
at 739-40; Weingast, supra note 183, at 246. 
 228. Stephenson, supra note 183, at 63-64. 
 229. See Stephenson, supra note 183, at 68. 
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power. However, in Stephenson’s model, the signals sent by 
the parties in power are “noisy,” which is to say, they are 
equivocal between cooperation and non-cooperation, from 
the perspective of the party out of power.230 The party out of 
power thus does not know whether it should behave non-
cooperatively in the next round. A third-party signal 
correlated with the actual behavior of the party in power 
enables the parties to coordinate.231 The third party, of 
course, is the independent judiciary. 
Nothing in the model supposes that the political parties 
are obligated to adopt the judiciary’s view of the law. 
Stephenson is explicit about this. His model envisions only a 
judicial declaration of the legality or illegality of 
government policy. The government is not bound by the 
declaration. As Stephenson puts it, “[T]he judiciary does not 
have the power to ‘veto’ a government policy on grounds of 
illegality. All the judiciary can do is make a declaration of 
illegality. The government can choose to modify its policy . . 
. , but it need not.”232 Conceptually, it is relatively easy see 
why this should be so. The judiciary’s only role in 
Stephenson’s model is to send a public signal about the 
conduct of the party in power. A public signal enables the 
parties to sustain coordination themselves by using a 
reciprocal strategy of some kind.233 
Other models, however, do appear to presuppose 
judicial supremacy, at least at first glance. In some cases, 
the benefit associated with judicial power depends on the 
certainty that a single voice provides.234 The presence of 
multiple constitutional interpretations can interfere with 
  
 230. Id. (“[P]olitical parties cannot enforce mutual restraint on their own 
because each party can never be sure that its opponent is cooperating and that 
its opponent knows that it is cooperating.”). 
 231. See id. at 69. 
 232. Id. at 66. 
 233. For similar reasons, Ramseyer’s analysis, as well as a theory due to 
William Landes and Richard Posner, do not presuppose judicial supremacy. See 
generally Ramseyer, supra note 183 (developing a theory of judicial supremacy 
based on future benefits to those currently in power); Landes & Posner, supra 
note 183 (similar). 
 234. See Alexander & Schauer, supra note 19, at 1371. 
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the coordinating function ascribed to the courts. If there are 
conflicting signals as to the constitutionality of government 
action, then parties must somehow settle on one of those 
signals to use in coordination. Others must be identified as 
“interlopers.”235 
We can see the effect of departmentalism on 
coordination-based theories of judicial review by revisiting 
David Law’s theory of judicial review, described briefly 
above. Law is a majoritarian about judicial review. He 
argues that judicial review enhances popular control over 
political actors by solving the principal-agent problem that 
affects all forms of representative constitutional 
government.236 If people must act together to effectively 
resist unconstitutional exercises of power, they need a 
signal for their coordination. The signal shapes expectations 
about how others will react. It ensures that, in Law’s 
formulation, “everyone [] know[s] not only that the 
[government] has misbehaved, but also that everyone 
knows, and that everyone knows that everyone knows.”237 
The people themselves are unable to directly monitor the 
government because, in Law’s view, “[l]egal information is 
not easy for ordinary people to obtain and absorb.”238 Even 
assuming people possessed the requisite expertise, they 
would be likely to disagree on a regular basis as to whether 
there was, in fact, unconstitutional governmental action.239 
Crucially, they would lack a basis for believing it common 
knowledge that the government had acted 
unconstitutionally. The Supreme Court, however, can play 
this role. Its decisions create a public signal of 
constitutionality that all citizens expect to be treated as a 
  
 235. McAdams, Expressive Power of Adjudication, supra note 183, at 1058-59. 
 236. I omit for clarity Law’s second explanation of how the courts solve the 
principal-agent problem: by providing the people with information about 
governmental action. Law, supra note 183, at 731-32. 
 237. Id. at 742. 
 238. Id. at 743, 773. 
 239. Id. at 773. 
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basis for action.240 In the language of game theory, the 
Court’s views serve as a “focal point.”241 
As Law points out, a focal point must be unique.242 
Competing signals about the constitutionality of 
government action defeat the purpose of generating a 
shared expectation as to how others will act. It is here, of 
course, that departmentalism would appear to run into 
trouble; for it contemplates the publication of constitutional 
interpretations by each branch as part of an ongoing process 
of constitutional collaboration. No one participant in the 
process enjoys a definitive or ultimate power of 
interpretation. Suppose that Congress enacts a law and that 
the president signs it, agreeing that it is constitutional; but, 
sometime later, the Supreme Court refuses to enforce the 
law, on the grounds that it exceeds Congress’s power under 
the Constitution. Can the Court’s opinion generate common 
knowledge among the people about how they will respond to 
the continued enforcement of the law by the president? 
Well, why not? As Law admits, there are, in any 
democratic system of government, “a cacophony of 
competing voices as to the constitutionality of government 
conduct.”243 What privileges the voice of the Court, he says, 
is that it comes from “an organ of government with various 
trappings of authority and formal responsibility for 
interpretation of the constitution.”244 In other words, it is the 
Court’s publicly known positive status as the organ of 
government charged with constitutional interpretation that 
makes its opinion a focal point. Law draws an analogy to a 
traffic intersection with a police officer and a number of 
private interlopers, each attempting to direct traffic using 
hand signals.245 “Only one of those people,” Law observes, “is 
  
 240. See id. at 770-71. 
 241. Id. at 771. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 774. 
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wearing a dark blue uniform and a badge that reads ‘traffic 
enforcement.’”246 
But of course, there is nothing in in Article III that 
bestows such an interpretative privilege on the Court. It has 
no interpretative badge. Judicial supremacy is a political 
artifact. As Whittington has shown, it was fought for—
sometimes by the Court, and sometimes by the president or 
the Congress—and represents a particular point of 
development in the political history of the United States.247  
We also know that judicial supremacy was preceded by a 
significant and widespread practice of popular enforcement 
of the Constitution.248 And although our system today is 
neither departmentalist nor (deeply) popular, there are, 
under our current constitutional regime, spheres of 
executive independence and judicial deference in 
constitutional interpretation.249 In short, judicial supremacy 
is an accidental feature of our constitutional regime. 
Notably, nothing about this history violates formal theory. 
As Law acknowledges, game theory allows for coordination 
in the presence of multiple interpreters. Even if there were 
two constitutional courts, he says, “a strategy of responding 
only when both courts agree, and not when the courts send 
contradictory signals” would likely be a focal point.250 
Therein lies our solution. It bears repeating that Law’s 
theory is meant to describe cases of mass resistance or 
revolution, not ordinary political conduct.251 It seems likely 
that treating the opinion of a single court as a focal point 
will overpredict such forms of collective political action. The 
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explanation has to be made to bear the weight of sustained 
disagreement about the constitutionality of government 
action, and to include the views of the people themselves, 
who, contrary to Law’s supposition, are perfectly equipped 
to form reasonable views about the meaning of the 
Constitution. Imagine, then, that the people are constantly 
receiving multiple, conflicting “official” signals about the 
constitutionality of government action, as they would be 
under moderate departmentalism. It would seem that the 
following strategy would be focal: resist only if there is a 
public, commonly persuasive view that the government has 
exceeded its constitutional authority. Since most such views 
are not commonly persuasive, we should expect widespread 
resistance to be rare. Such resistance would occur when it 
naturally would under a constitutional system: when there 
is no reasonable question that the government has exceeded 
its authority. Under this strategy, the more voices the 
better, since each voice has the potential to expose 
unconstitutional governmental action. 
CONCLUSION 
I have advanced two arguments in favor of moderate 
departmentalism. First, moderate departmentalism is 
collaborative, in the sense that it enhances the presidential 
role in the dialogical process of constitutional 
interpretation. The president’s meaningful participation in 
this process gives him ownership over the resulting 
constitutional rule, making it more likely that he will 
comply with that rule. Second, under moderate 
departmentalism there are strategic reasons, based in the 
logic of repeat play, for the president to comply even with 
facially unfriendly constitutional rules. These reasons 
include avoiding the future costs of repeat litigation and 
gaining the future benefits of being publicly seen to freely 
adopt a rule announced by the Supreme Court. Taken 
together, these arguments suggest that we should 
reconsider the standard view of the relationship between 
departmentalism and presidential control. There are 
reasons to think that departmentalism promises not to 
unbind the president from the fundamental law, but to 
given him reason to bind himself to that law—a far more 
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effective strategy for achieving compliance over the long 
run. 
 
 
